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HOT Lanes in Houston—
Six Years of Experience
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Abstr
act
Abstract
High occupancy/toll (HOT) lanes allow travelers to pay a toll to enter a high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lane when they do not meet the minimum occupancy restrictions of the lane. In cases where HOV lanes are not utilized to their full capacity, this
provides an effective, and controlled, use of that spare capacity along with a revenue
source to offset expenses. Although this is a promising concept, and many cities around
the United States are examining the potential development of a HOT lane, only four
HOT lanes currently exist. This research documents the findings of six years of experience with two HOT lanes in Houston, Texas. This includes an examination of the daily
number of paying customers on the HOT lanes, benefits of the HOT lanes, socioeconomic and commute characteristics of HOT lane users, and their mode of choice
when electing not to use the HOT lane.

Introduction
The Houston metropolitan area has had a long and successful history of using highoccupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes to move travelers quickly and efficiently. The first
HOV lane opened to buses and registered vanpools in 1979 on the North Freeway
(I-45). Despite these occupancy restrictions the lane was highly successful and carried nearly as many people in the peak period as the two adjacent freeway lanes
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combined (Turnbull 2003). As a result of this successful demonstration, this HOV
lane was barrier separated and became a permanent fixture on this freeway.
Next, a permanent HOV lane was constructed on the Katy Freeway (I-10). Following this, HOV lanes were constructed on I-45 south of downtown Houston, US 59
both north and south of downtown Houston, and the Northwest Freeway (US
290) (see Figure 1). All of these HOV lanes are barrier separated, have adjacent
park-and-ride lots, and have significant transit usage; many have direct freeway
access (see Figure 2). The result is a system of bus rapid transit (BRT) lanes.

Figure 1. Houston’s HOV Lanes

Source: Houston METRO (http://www.ridemetro.org/services/areahovmap.asp).
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Figure 2. Park-and-Ride Access to a Barrier-Separated HOV Lane
via a T-Ramp

When the Katy HOV lane opened in 1984, only transit buses and registered vanpools
could use it (Bullard 1991). To make better use of this road capacity, the restrictions were relaxed in stages until any vehicles with two or more occupants (HOV2+)
were allowed. The lane soon became congested during peak traffic periods due to
the high number of carpool vehicles using the lane. This prompted Houston METRO,
the transit agency responsible for the operation of the HOV lanes, along with TxDOT,
to restrict usage to HOV3+ during the morning peak period (6:45 a.m. to 8:15
a.m.) in 1988.1 Soon after, congestion during the afternoon peak period (5:00 p.m.
to 6:00 p.m.) necessitated HOV3+ restrictions then as well. Most recently, the morning peak period (6:45 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.) on the Northwest Freeway (US 290) also
changed occupancy restrictions to HOV3+.
Not surprisingly, these occupancy restrictions (HOV3+) resulted in a considerable
reduction in peak-period traffic and available capacity in the HOV lanes. However,
less onerous restrictions (HOV2+) had resulted in excess demand and congestion
on the lanes. One potential solution was to allow HOV2s to use the lanes for a
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price during the peak periods. This would limit demand to an acceptable level,
make more efficient use of the lane, and provide a revenue source to help pay for
the program. Thus, Houston’s QuickRide program was created.
QuickRide began in January 1998 on the Katy Freeway and then in November 2000
on the Northwest Freeway. To use the HOV lanes during periods normally restricted
to vehicles with three or more occupants, vehicles with two occupants pay a $2
toll and a $2.50 monthly fee. This form of HOV lane is often referred to as a highoccupancy/toll (HOT) lane. As of June 2004, there were only four HOT lanes in
existence (all in the United States—these two in Houston and two in California).
However, many cities are exploring the option of converting HOV lanes to HOT
lanes (Value Pricing Homepage 2004).
In addition to making more efficient use of roadway capacity, HOT lanes offer travelers the additional choice of paying for fast, reliable travel. Evidence from California and Houston HOT lanes indicates few drivers use the lanes on a frequent basis
(Burris and Appiah 2004; Sullivan 2000; Supernak et al. 2001). Rather, the majority
of drivers use the lane infrequently, possibly when they are particularly pressed for
time or cannot risk the unreliable travel times offered by the free lanes.
Travel options available to travelers using the Katy and Northwest corridors are
therefore extensive. The options include:


drive alone or with passengers on the main lanes (peak or off-peak);



drive with one passenger on the HOV lanes:
- for free in the off-peak or
- for a $2 toll in the peak/QuickRide periods (defined as 6:45 to 8:00
a.m. on both Katy and Northwest Freeways and 5:00 to 6:00 p.m. on
Katy);
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drive with two or more passengers for free on the HOV lanes;



use transit (coach buses, as shown in Figure 3) with fare levels ranging from
$1 to $3.50; and



join a casual carpool, which travels on HOV lanes for free.2
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Figure 3. Houston METRO Commuter Bus on HOV Lane

This myriad of choices provides travelers in these corridors more opportunity to
optimize their travel behavior, and increases the net societal benefits of travel in
the corridor. However, there is room for improvement, and changes to the QuickRide
program are under investigation to further optimize the use of the HOV lanes (see
the section “The Future of QuickRide”). Prior to these potential improvements it
was critical to understand driver behavior and current use of the HOV lanes. Therefore, this article examines the benefits of the QuickRide program, usage patterns,
and socioeconomic and travel characteristics of QuickRide users.

Benefits of the QuickRide Program
QuickRide offers HOV2 vehicles additional travel options that had not been available to them. HOV2 options now include:


travel on the congested main lanes at any time,



travel on the HOV lane during off-peak periods, and



travel on the HOV lanes during peak periods for a $2 toll (QuickRide).

Therefore, HOV2s’ primary benefits derive from either


travel-time savings versus travel on the main lanes, or



travel at their preferred time of day instead of the off-peak period.
5
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To simplify this discussion, the benefits derived from travelers who switched modes
to take advantage of QuickRide were assumed to be similar to the HOV2 travelers.
For example, assume a pair of transit users formed an HOV2 to take advantage of
the QuickRide program. Their travel time on the HOV lane would not change, but
the travelers must have perceived some benefits to make this mode switch. These
benefits were assumed to be similar in size to those benefits derived from HOV2s
who received a faster travel time.
Another difficult benefit to measure is the benefit of traveling at one’s preferred
time of day. There is an interesting body of research on this issue (Arnott et al.
1998; Arnott et al. 1996; Chen and Bernstein 1995; Chu 1995; Verhoef 2000; Small
1992), but empirical results are extremely limited. Therefore, the exact value of the
disbenefit that occurs when a morning commute is taken at a suboptimal time is
unknown but would include either a penalty for:


leaving home early (lost sleep, reduced time with family, etc.), or



arriving late to work.

Reducing either of these penalties is a direct benefit to the drivers, albeit one that
is extremely difficult to estimate. In addition, it is difficult to determine what percentage of QuickRide trips are a result of shifting from the main lanes (resulting in
travel-time savings) or shifting from the off-peak (resulting in the benefit of traveling at their preferred time of travel). Therefore, for the analysis outlined here, it was
assumed that the benefits of those QuickRide users who altered their time of travel
to the peak period (and therefore experienced no change in travel time) was approximately equal to the benefits obtained by those QuickRide users who reduced
their travel time by shifting to the HOV lane (and therefore did not change their
time of travel).
Although still an estimation, determining the value of travel-time savings is more
straightforward. To estimate the travel-time savings offered by QuickRide, it was
necessary to determine both the number of QuickRide trips and typical traveltime savings. Fortunately, Houston uses an extensive automatic vehicle identification (AVI) system on many of its freeways (main lanes and HOV lanes) to estimate
vehicle speeds (Texas Department of Transportation 2004), and this data source
provided millions of vehicle speeds. Surveys of HOV lane users and vehicle counts
were used to estimate the average distance traveled on each HOV lane by QuickRide
participants. These average travel distances were then divided by the average speed
found using Equation 1 to determine average travel times for both the HOV lanes
6
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and the main lanes. Additionally, the number of QuickRide trips per day was recorded by the same AVI system for toll collection purposes (see Table 1). Multiplying the difference in travel times between the HOV and main lanes by the number
of QuickRide users resulted in the average travel-time savings shown in Table 1.
The average time to form a carpool, 4.33 minutes as reported in a survey of
QuickRide participants, was subtracted from these travel-time savings prior to
determining the value of travel-time savings.

(1)

Combined with the benefit of travel-time savings, there is the benefit of a more
reliable travel time. The HOV lane offers very reliable travel times where the travel
time on the main lanes is much more unpredictable. For example, Figure 4 indicates average daily travel speeds from one section of the Northwest Freeway for
the first nine months of 2002. On the main lanes, the speeds were most frequently
between 15 mph and 30 mph but occasionally reached 60 mph. Traveling at these
speeds—15 mph, 30 mph, and 60 mph—leads to greatly different travel times (40
minutes, 20 minutes, and 10 minutes, respectively) on a 10-mile section of highway.

7
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Northwest AM

Katy PM

Katy AM

Table 1. 2001 Travel-Time Savings
Time

Vehicles
per Day

Smain (mph)

SHOV (mph)

Time Savings
(min/veh)

6:45–7:00

11.11

29.76

53.98

11.58

7:00–7:15
7:15–7:30

19.48
23.61

27.25
24.48

59.81
60.21

15.35
18.62

7:30–7:45
7:45–8:00

23.49
10.18

23.37
24.79

60.11
59.48

20.08
18.06

Weighted Average (AM)

25.50

59.22

17.33

5:00–5:15
5:15–5:30
5:30–5:45

7.03
14.15
12.18

28.35
26.13
26.97

57.19
58.34
57.63

13.66
16.23
15.15

5:45–6:00

6.71

28.61

58.70

13.76

Weighted Average (PM)

27.19

57.98

15.04

6:45–7:00

2.83

34.36

53.01

6.27

7:00–7:15
7:15–7:30

8.01
14.02

31.89
28.72

57.91
58.85

8.62
10.91

7:30–7:45
7:45–8:00

16.15
7.25

27.44
30.09

59.52
59.82

12.02
10.11

29.35

58.72

10.51

Weighted Average (AM)

Average distance traveled on the Katy HOV lane was 12.8 miles, and on the Northwest HOV lane
was 10.6 miles.
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Figure 4. Example of the Speed Distribution on the HOV Lane
and Main Lanes

Although it is difficult to estimate to exact value, there is clear evidence that traveltime reliability is valued at least as much as the travel-time savings itself (Small et
al. 1999; Bates et al. 2001; Hensher 2001). To conservatively estimate this value of
time and reliability, the average value of travel-time savings was assumed to be 35
percent of the QuickRide participant’s wage rate (as reported in the survey discussed below). Research in this area has generally shown drivers to value their time
in congested travel conditions at a higher rate than 35 percent of their hourly wage,
so this should provide a conservative value of travel-time savings. Additionally,
approximately 21 percent of carpools included a child, and that child’s value of
travel-time savings was assumed to be $0. This resulted in an average value of traveltime savings of $31.13 per hour per vehicle (or $15.56 per hour per person). Using
this conservative value of time, actual and predicted QuickRide trips over 10 years,
and current travel-time savings minus carpool formation times, the net present
value of the benefits of QuickRide travel-time savings were estimated to be approximately $2.35 million.1
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QuickRide participants also experience reduced vehicle operating costs and reduced fuel usage. Based on fleet average fuel usage, and typical fuel prices,2 the
total fuel savings was estimated to be approximately $13,500 over 10 years. This is
an underestimation of actual fuel savings since these savings are based on MOBILE
5a modeling of the average speed readings recorded by the AVI equipment which
is spaced at 3- to 5-mile intervals. These speed measurements fail to capture the
fuel-intensive deceleration and acceleration patterns of vehicles that occurs on the
main lanes during these peak periods. Even so, the value of fuel savings and emissions reduction was inconsequential when compared to the value of travel-time
savings.
This brief analysis of benefits may considerably underestimate the true value of the
QuickRide option. The 35 percent of wage rate personal value of time is an average, whereas the QuickRide users are mainly occasional users—presumably when
their value of time is much higher than average. In addition, any benefit that may
be experienced by main-lane users due to the small number of QuickRide participants leaving the main lanes is ignored.
Conversely, there are no costs experienced by either the existing HOV-lane users
or the main-lane users. Since traffic on the HOV lane maintains free flow, users of
the lane are not negatively impacted by the addition of the QuickRide vehicles.
Therefore, despite the net societal benefit of the program being relatively small, it
is beneficial since net societal costs to travelers are nonexistent.3

QuickRide Usage
This section provides an in-depth examination of those travelers taking advantage
of QuickRide due to the benefits discussed above. The data used in these analyses
were from:


billing records of all recorded QuickRide trips from the inception of the
program in 1998, and



a survey conducted in April 2003 of all current and former QuickRide enrollees.

QuickRide has experienced a slow and steady increase in usage since it began in
1998. Usage patterns include a significant decrease on Fridays4 and decreases that
generally correspond to grade school holidays, including the summer break (see
Figure 5). These latter decreases are primarily caused by the absence of carpools
10
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where one member is a grade school child and to a lesser extent by decreased
traffic levels in the main lanes, resulting in less congestion and less incentive to pay
for QuickRide. For 2003, there were an average of 86.4 QuickRide users during the
morning period on Katy Freeway, 54.9 during the afternoon period on Katy Freeway, and 66.8 during the morning period on the Northwest Freeway. This total of
208.1 QuickRide trips per day is relatively small, but with limited capacity on the
single HOV lanes total usage must remain limited.
Figure 5. QuickRide Billed Trips per Month
(Five-Month Moving Averages)

QuickRide billing records for 2003 show that QuickRide enrollees take a QuickRide
trip on an infrequent basis (see Figure 6).1 In fact, the majority of enrollees made
an average of fewer than 1.5 QuickRide trips per week. These results are similar to
what has been recorded on the California HOT lanes (Shivashanker et al. 2004,
Sullivan 2000).
These usage patterns appear to indicate that most drivers feel the travel-time savings is worth the $2 toll (plus the need for a second occupant) only occasionally.
They appear to use QuickRide only when they need the additional travel-time
savings and it is convenient to carpool with one other person. The requirement for
drivers to carpool is a larger deterrent to QuickRide usage than is the $2 toll (Burris
and Appiah 2004). The following section takes an in-depth look at who is using the
QuickRide program and their perception of travel-time savings.
11
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Figure 6. Number of Monthly QuickRide Trips by
Transponder Identification Number

Characteristics of QuickRide Participants
The results from two surveys were examined to determine the characteristics of
QuickRide participants. The first survey was conducted in April 1998, shortly after
QuickRide began. A total of 185 QuickRide enrollees, out of a total of 387 enrollees, completed and returned their survey for a response rate of 48 percent. The
second survey was mailed in March 2003 to all 1,459 QuickRide enrollees. A total
of 93 surveys were returned due to bad addresses. Of the remaining 1,366 surveys,
525 were completed and returned for a response rate of 38 percent.
The 1998 survey results provided insight into QuickRide participants’ previous/
alternate mode of travel (Stockton et al., 2000) (see Table 2). Similar results were
obtained in the 2003 survey (see Table 3). As shown in Table 3, when not using
QuickRide, the majority of trips are made by single-occupant vehicles (SOVs) followed by HOV2s in off-peak hours. These travelers use approximately 45 percent
more vehicles when not using QuickRide. Therefore, the QuickRide program increases average vehicle occupancy on the corridor.

12

HOT Lanes in Houston-—Six Years of Experience

Table 2. Previous Mode and Time of Travel of QuickRide Enrollees

Mode of QuickRide
Enrollees Before
QuickRide

AM

PM

Shouldersa

Peakb

Total

Shouldersa

Peakb

Total

12.7%

38.0%

50.7%

24.5%

33.2%

57.7%

7.0%

---

7.0%

6.8%

---

6.8%

Two-Person HOV,
Freeway

10.7%

12.0%

22.7%

3.6%

25.7%

29.3%

3+ HOV

2.3%

2.4%

4.7%

-2.4%c

-3.7%c

-6.1% c

Vanpool
Bus

0.0%
0.6%

2.0%
10.0%

2.0%
10.6%

0.0%
1.6%

2.3%
3.7%

2.3%
5.3%

Other
Total

0.0%
33.2%

2.4%
66.8%

2.4%
100.0%

0.0%
34.1%

4.7%
65.9%

4.7%
100.0%

Drive Alone
Two-Person HOV,
HOV Lane

Notes:

a=periods before and after the peaks.
b=peak periods defined as 6:45 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. and 5 p.m. to 6 p.m.
c=a negative value indicates increased 3+ carpool usage by QuickRide enrollees
Source: Stockton et al. 2000.

Table 3. Distribution of Vehicle Occupancy for Non-QuickRide Trips

Occupancy During
Non-QuickRide Trips
(persons)

Percentage of
Current QuickRide
Participants

Corresponding
Number of
Vehicles

1

53.6

53.6

2
3

30.4
6.6

15.7
2.2

4
5 or More

2.0
3.9

0.5
0.8

Bus
Total

3.5
100

0
72.8
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The survey also examined commute characteristics of travelers while they were
using QuickRide. Some of these results are discussed below. (For a more complete
analysis of these survey results, see Burris and Appiah (2004)).
Travelers perceived QuickRide saved them approximately twice as much time as
was typically saved on the HOV lane. For example, QuickRide participants who
most often take advantage of QuickRide on the Katy Freeway in the morning estimated they saved an average of 34.7 minutes (± 1.13 minutes at a 95% confidence
interval) where average savings (for the entire year of 2002) was approximately
17.3 minutes. This is probably a combination of QuickRide users (1) overestimating their time savings due to drivers’ dislike of congested travel conditions (Small
et al. 1999); (2) using QuickRide when they were particularly pressed for time, again
causing them to overestimate their time savings; and (3) using QuickRide on days
when main-lane congestion was worse than average. However, the third possibility
is unlikely since the number of QuickRide trips was relatively constant on a day-today basis, regardless of main-lane congestion. For example, the average number of
QuickRide trips during the Katy Freeway morning period for September 2003 was
93.9 ± 5.6 (at a 95% confidence interval) with a standard deviation of 12.7 trips per
day.
QuickRide participants most frequently carpooled with a coworker (35%), followed
by an adult family member (31%), a child (21%), a casual carpool (6%), a neighbor
(3%), or other (4%). The 21 percent of carpools formed with a child was not surprising as significant drops in the number of QuickRide trips were observed to
correspond with school holidays (see Figure 5). QuickRide participants estimated
they required an average of 4.3 minutes to pick up their carpool partner. The majority of participants (73%) did not have the passenger help pay the $2 toll. Finally,
the majority of QuickRide trips (67%) were for commuting, followed by school
(11%), recreation (10%), and other (8%).
A brief examination of the survey respondents’ socioeconomic characteristics reveals a group who are primarily (61%) married with child(ren) or (30%) married
without children. Most (65%) are in professional or managerial positions, 64 percent are between the ages of 35 to 54, 74 percent have a college degree, and 79
percent have a household income greater than $75,000 per year. The number of
males and females responding to the survey was similar.

14
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Based on these survey findings it was clear that QuickRide users generally have
high household incomes and placed a premium on their time. Additional research
is currently underway to determine the differences between this group of commuters and other commuters along the Katy and Northwest Freeway corridors.

The Future of QuickRide
The QuickRide program may see significant changes in the near future, with alternate pricing and occupancy restrictions under investigation. The following actions
are currently being considered:
1. expanding the HOV3+ restriction (and the QuickRide program) to the afternoon peak period on the Northwest Freeway,
2. expanding the HOV3+ restriction (and the QuickRide program) to the
shoulders of each peak period in conjunction with time-of-day variable
pricing where the shoulder toll is less than the peak-period toll, and
3. allowing SOVs to pay to use the lane during off-peak periods.
The first two options listed above include expansion of the current HOV3+ occupancy restrictions. This is under consideration due to building congestion on the
two freeways during the shoulders of the peak and on the Northwest Freeway in
the afternoon peak period. Figures 7 and 8 show average daily travel speeds on the
HOV lanes for the year 2002. From these figures it is clear that demand during
these periods is beginning to cause deterioration in the level of service on the HOV
lane—which must be prevented to maintain the attractiveness of the lane and use
of HOV and transit. The periods with the slowest speeds are just before and just
after the QuickRide (and HOV3+ restriction) period. Based on analysis of the composition of vehicles during the day, it is clear that the demand and congestion is
primarily caused by HOV2s who travel just before or just after the peak period.
To alleviate this congestion but still allow some HOV2s to use the lane, QuickRide
may also be expanded to these shoulder periods. Research is underway to determine the proper QuickRide toll during the shoulder periods to smooth the demand for the HOV lane during the peak and shoulder times.

15
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Figure 7. Vehicle Flow on the Katy HOV Lane

Figure 8. Vehicle Flow on the Northwest HOV Lane

Figure 9. Average Travel-Time Savings Using the Katy HOV Lane
Instead of the Main Lanes

16
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Another option under investigation is allowing SOVs to use the lane during offpeak periods. Congestion on the main lanes is such that significant travel-time
savings can be obtained well after the morning shoulder periods and before the
afternoon shoulders (see Figure 9). Additionally, there is excess capacity in the HOV
lanes during those periods.
Therefore, SOV vehicles may be willing to pay a toll to use the lanes during this
period. Research is currently underway to determine the costs and revenue from
this option. Particularly important is to determine the pricing mechanism and price
levels for SOVs to ensure the HOV lanes remain free flowing during all periods of
the day.
In the longer term, managed lanes are under construction and are slated to open
on the Katy Freeway by 2010. In this scenario the middle four lanes (two per direction) will be toll lanes. These lanes represent new capacity on the Katy Freeway.
The exact pricing scenarios are not set, but buses will not be charged a toll and
carpools may be offered a reduced toll level.

Conclusions
The Houston QuickRide program currently offers HOV2s the option of traveling
on the Katy and Northwest HOV lanes for $2 when the lanes are normally restricted to HOV3+. This provides HOV2s another travel option, allowing its drivers
to further optimize their travel behavior, and results in net societal benefits.
The QuickRide program receives relatively modest usage (an average of 208 trips
per day in 2003) partially due to the limited amount of room available on either of
the single HOV lanes. This relatively limited usage is comprised of a large number
of users taking advantage of QuickRide on an infrequent basis (less than 2.5 trips
per month). Despite the limited usage, the program provides a net societal benefit, primarily due to travel-time savings obtained by QuickRide participants.
The future of QuickRide holds several potential changes. Due to congestion on
either side of the HOV3+ period (when HOV2+ is allowed), the HOV3+ period
may be expanded. The expanded periods may have a lower toll, resulting in a variable HOT toll price based on time of day. Further into the future, SOVs may be
charged for the privilege of using the HOV lane in the off-peak periods, using a
dynamic pricing mechanism that will be priced based on the congestion level in
the lane. Based on the findings from the first six years of operation, researchers are
17
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examining the optimal configuration, pricing levels, enforcement methods, signage,
and public awareness needed to successfully implement these changes and increase
the net societal benefits of the program.

Endnotes
1

The time period changed to 6:45 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. in 1990 and has not changed
since.

2

Casual carpoolers are well aware of the different occupancy restriction on the
HOV lanes based on the time of day. In almost all cases, during peak periods two
“slugs” (casual carpoolers who get a ride in another person’s vehicle) get into each
vehicle, while during off-peak periods only one “slug” gets in each vehicle.

3

Using the federal government Office of Management and Budget’s real 10-year
discount rate of 3.1 percent.

4

The typical fuel price is the price at the pump minus any taxes since taxes are a
transfer of wealth and do not constitute a net societal benefit.

5

There were start-up costs and ongoing maintenance and operational costs paid
by METRO. The toll revenues are used to pay the ongoing operational and maintenance costs.
6

Using time series analysis and an ANOVA analysis, it was found that Friday
QuickRide volumes were significantly lower than the rest of the week at the 5 percent significance level.

7

Actual usage could be greater than that captured by the billing readers due to
malfunctions of the equipment or willful violators. Research is underway to address this problem and minimize the number of violators on the lane. However,
based on violation data, it is clear that not all enrollees are being charged when
they take a QuickRide trip. Therefore, these violators are also benefiting from the
program—but are not included in the benefit analysis.
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Abstr
act
Abstract
Crime on the railways in Britain is an increasing concern for train operating companies, the British Transport Police (BTP), passengers, and local residents. Significantly,
rail users consistently perceive their risks from crime to be considerably higher than
official crime statistics indicate, having a negative affect on levels of patronage. This
article presents an exploratory study of passengers’ fear of crime while waiting at
railway stations using Quick Time Virtual Reality (QTVR) walkthrough scenes. QTVR
arguably represents an innovative, dynamic, and interactive environmental stimulus
for gaining insights into passengers’ fear of crime. Visibility at stations was identified
as a crucial factor in determining levels of fear of crime. The design of the station
shelter is analyzed as an example of how crime prevention through environmental
design (CPTED) is being implemented on railway stations by Valley Lines (Wales and
Borders Trains) on its network in South Wales (UK).

23

Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2004

Introduction
The recent environmental and social concerns associated with an increasingly carreliant society have provided a new impetus for promoting public transport. Rail
travel represents 5 percent of all passenger journeys in the UK (Hamilton and Jenkins
2000) and is currently subject to a large-scale regeneration program with health
and safety issues representing a critical focus in the light of recent tragedies at
Paddington and Hatfield. The industry is certainly striving to encourage potential
passengers to “let the train take the strain.” However, crime on the railways has
recently emerged as a high profile priority requiring scrutiny and attention. Indeed, media reports of the murder of Liz Sherlock at Euston station have certainly
raised public awareness and one headline in the Independent newspaper read “Robberies on the Rise in Britain’s Dark, Dangerous Train Stations” (Lashmar 2001). Railways represent a vital part of Britain’s public transport system and one of the UK
government’s stated policy objectives is to provide safe travel for the public; “We
want people to travel safely and to feel secure whether they are on foot or bicycle,
in a car, on a train, or bus, at sea or on a plane” (DETR 2000, p75).
According to the British Transport Police recorded crime on the railways rose by
5.6 percent in 2001–2002 (Guardian 2002). Crucially, however, recorded crime statistics represent only a fraction of total crime (Mirrlees-Black et al. 1998). The “dark
figure of crime” (Maguire et al. 1997) represents the missing data that may not be
witnessed or discovered, or remains either unreported or unrecorded—for a variety of complex reasons. This issue also applies to the transport environment as the
UK government acknowledges: “a large proportion of crime on public transport is
not reported” (DETR 1998a). Reluctance to delay one’s journey, a lack of confidence that the offender will be apprehended, the absence of someone to actually
report an incident to, and the belief that a reported incident will not be taken
seriously are examples of nonreporting behavior.
This article discusses crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) and
the fear of crime as it relates to the railway station and its immediate access routes
and presents an exploratory study of passenger’ fear of crime using Quick Time
Virtual Reality (QTVR) as the environmental stimuli. The performance of one specific CPTED modification, the introduction of the transparent railway station shelter, is compared with its predecessor.
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Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)
CPTED (pronounced sep-ted) asserts that “the proper design and effective use of
the built environment can lead to a reduction in the fear of crime and the incidence of crime, and to an improvement in the quality of life” (Crowe 2000, p1).
The urban environment can be designed or modified to reduce opportunities for
crime and fear of crime by promoting:


Natural Surveillance. The placement of physical features, activities, and
people in such ways as to maximize visibility. This also involves the lighting
of public spaces and walkways at night.



Natural Access Control. The physical guidance of people entering and exiting a space by the judicial placement of signs, entrances, exits, fencing, landscaping, and lighting.



Territorial Reinforcement. The use of physical attributes that express ownership, such as fences, pavement treatments, artwork, signage, landscaping, and placement of buildings.



Image/Maintenance. Allows for the continued use of space for its intended
purpose and serves as an additional expression of ownership. This also
involves supporting a positive image through the selection of materials,
design, and scale.

CPTED strategies continue to be implemented in a wide range of urban settings at
an international level and there is increasing volume of research activity seeking to
evaluate real-world applications of CPTED (e.g., Levine et al. 1986; Loukaitou-Sideris
and Banerjee 1994; La Vigne 1996; Hunter and Jeffery 1997; Sloan-Hewitt and Kelling
1997). However, Eck (1997) has reviewed various studies of public transport (Kenney
1987; Poyner 1988; Carr and Spring 1993; La Vigne 1997) and claims that despite
such studies, little is currently known about the effectiveness of design interventions. The variety of crimes, number of different settings in the transport system,
and the diversity of victim types effectively means that “we cannot therefore, identify with reasonable certainty, any specific tactic against specific crimes, that can
be said to ‘work’ across similar settings in other cities” (Eck 1997, p16). Indeed,
Schneider and Kitchen (2002, p293) argue that “approaches need to be tailored to
specific local circumstances.” Clearly, although many CPTED measures may have
been successful (or not) in any one context, a site-specific approach to analysing
crime and the fear of crime at Britain’s railway stations and their immediate access
routes appears to be vital.
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Fear of crime in the built environment can result in the withdrawal of the community and a reduction of crucial “eyes on the street” that can actively contribute to
policing a neighbourhood (Jacobs 1961; Newman 1973). Similarly, perceptions of
crime on the railways will undoubtedly affect levels of patronage. Recorded crime
on the railways is low while the perception of crime has consistently been found to
be significantly higher (Brantingham et al. 1991; Crime Concern and Transport and
Travel Research 1997). Crucially, Clarke (1996, p3) observes “…the fear of crime
that stops many people using public transport has a serious impact on revenues.”
Crime Concern and Transport and Travel Research (1997) suggested that there
might be as much as a 15 percent increase in passengers for all rail journeys if a
range of anticrime initiatives were successfully implemented.
Understanding the perceptual dimension to CPTED is clearly crucial, and has been
explored with regard to residential housing (Tijerino 1998; Ham-Rowbottom et al
1999; Cozens et al. 2001). Regarding public transport, perceptions are no less important, as noted by the Legislative Assembly of Queensland (Australia): “…the
public’s perception of crime is an important determinant of people’s usage of public transport” (Parliamentary Travel Safe Committee 1998, p16).

UK Government Policy for Tackling Crime on the Railways
The UK government is committed to providing an effective, safe, and thriving public
transport network (DETR 2000; DETR 2001) and clearly recognizes the contribution of design in facilitating or discouraging criminality (DOE 1994; Crime and Disorder Act 1998). Indeed, it has been asserted that “there is now an established link
both between design and crime and the reduction of fear” (DETR 1998b).
One initiative specific to the railways is the Secure Station Scheme. This scheme is
operated jointly by Crime Concern and the British Transport police (BTP) and is
arguably central to the government’s strategy for reducing crime and the fear of
crime in and around railway stations. It focuses on implementing CPTED strategies
at individual stations to reduce crime and the fear of crime. Currently, more than
150 railway stations in the UK have been accredited by the BTP and offers “… an
opportunity for Britain’s rail companies to improve security at their stations and
display to customers their desire to reduce crime” (DETR 1998a, p1). The number
of accredited railway stations continues to rise and the British government intends
this number to increase (DETR 2000), although currently this only represents 3
percent of Britain’s 2,500 or so railway stations (Lashmar 2001).
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Significantly, the accreditation can only be awarded to railway stations that exhibit
a threshold level of reported crime as a proportion of passenger throughput—
ignoring those railway stations with either high crime rates or low throughput levels—or both. Furthermore, to date no study has evaluated the effectiveness of this
scheme. Therefore, for railway stations outside the scope of the Secure Stations
Scheme (the majority of stations on the Valley Lines network), train operating companies (TOCs) must develop an alternative framework for tackling crime and the
fear of crime.
Indeed, Clarke (1996) has called for more studies to be funded by transit authorities and therefore, more communication between railway managers and CPTED
theorists and practitioners. Furthermore, the Head of Rail Research UK, Keith
Madelin (2003, p31), recently remarked that the rail industry “has ignored the potential benefits of academic research into new technologies and systems that could
help to solve some of its problems.”

The Valley Lines Study in South Wales (UK)
The Valley Lines rail network (part of the Wales and Borders franchise) is located in
South Wales and serves the communities of the Rhondda, Cynon, and Taff Valleys,
in addition to stations in Cardiff, Barry, and Penarth (see Figure 1). BTP statistics
reveal that 459 crimes took place on the Valley Lines’ railway stations which operated 7.3 million passenger journeys annually (2000–2001). This does not include
crimes that may have occurred on the train itself and equates to 6.26 crimes per
100,000 passenger journeys. Although not strictly comparable, the recorded crime
rate per 100,000 population for the South Wales police force area in 1999 was
10,251 (Home Office 2000).
In a recent Valley Lines’ Customer Satisfaction Survey (Pengwyn Services 2001)
1,000 rail users were interviewed while traveling on the network. To monitor passengers’ fear of crime, specific questions were included to probe the issue of fear of
crime while waiting at the station. Table 1 presents some of the preliminary findings. Clearly, a significant percentage of passengers experienced fear of crime at
their local station.
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Figure 1. Valley Lines Rail Network Map

Source: Valley Lines 2001.
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Table 1. Passengers’ Fear of Crime During Daytime (All Stations)

Station Activity

% of Respondents Experiencing
Fear of Crime

Approaching the station

4

Waiting inside the platform shelter

7

Waiting on the platform

7

Using the station car park

10

Source: Pengwyn Services, February 2001. Customer Satisfaction Survey for Cardiff Rail
Company Ltd.

Such feelings also varied considerably from station to station (Cozens 2002). Many
stations on the network did not generate substantial levels of fear of crime, although as many as 39 percent of respondents at certain stations stated that that
they experienced fear of crime while waiting inside the brick platform shelter. Furthermore, various design measures were suggested by respondents as potential
improvements that would reduce their sense of fear of crime (see Table 2).

Table 2. Perceived Effectiveness of Improvements

Improvement

% of Respondents StatingFear of
Crime Would be Reduced

Enhanced visibility (cctv, lighting, transparent shelters)

87

More rail staff visibly in attendance

87

Reliable information system

81

More passengers on the station

77

A cleaner environment

63

Source: Pengwyn Services, February 2001. Customer Satisfaction Survey for Cardiff Rail
Company Ltd.

Clearly, fear of crime was experienced across the network and improved visibility
was identified as a dimension that, if amended appropriately, respondents indicated would reduce their fear of crime while waiting at the railway station.
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The study systematically collected data from respondents relating to the design
and management of specific railway stations and their immediate access routes.
The analysis of this data would facilitate the evaluation of the effectiveness of CPTED
modifications in reducing crime and the fear of crime while waiting at railway stations. The use of QTVR technology to probe passengers’ perceptions of personal
safety in and around the railway station environment is presented as an innovative
and constructive way forward. This article presents some of the initial findings and
discusses the specific CPTED modification of the shelters provided at stations across
the Valley Lines network.

The QTVR Study Methodology
To investigate fear of crime across the network, a representative sample of six railway stations was selected. These were chosen to reflect the diversity of stations on
the network in terms of affluence/deprivation, geographical location (urban/rural), physical and security features, and usage levels.
Representations of the stations using QTVR provided a standardized, dynamic and
interactive stimulus for the often complex station layouts and access routes, which
could repeatedly be reemployed in various locations.
QTVR involves the photography of several 360 degree panoramas at various points
in the environment. These panoramas are subsequently stitched together to create a QTVR walk-through scene, whereby respondents can virtually travel through
the standardized environment of the station and its approaches, view in and out,
and pan left or right at any stage of their journey. Each focus group was shown the
same standardized walkthrough panoramas of stations in the controlled setting of
an interview room. This approach not only reduces the problems associated with
physically walking groups of people around several stations at different times and
under variable conditions (e.g., weather, lighting conditions, noise, usage patterns),
it also allowed for a more focused analysis of the physical detail of each station by
the respondents. The QTVR approach has been critically reviewed at conference
(Cozens et al. 2002) and widely received as a highly innovative approach at peer
review sessions and at subsequent presentations to groups of academics, planners,
and the police. Queensland Police in Australia and West Yorkshire Police in the UK
are already using QTVR for investigations at crime scenes. It is presented here as an
example of how QTVR can be operationally applied to underpin the systematic
analysis of the railway station environment and its immediate access routes.
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A total of 47 respondents (26 females and 21 males) were interviewed and asked
to complete a structured questionnaire following the presentation of QTVR walkthrough panorama scenes of the six selected railway stations and their immediate
access routes. Their comments during group discussions were also noted and later
analyzed.

The QTVR Study Findings
The initial findings from this study clearly indicate that there are specific times,
geographical locations, and design features at stations that elicit fear of crime. A
range of potential solutions was suggested by respondents to reduce fear of crime
which included improved lighting (mentioned by 68% of respondents), CCTV (62%),
more staff (43%), transparent shelters (43%), cleaner stations (38%), and cutting
back vegetation (30%). Although such findings may appear similar to those that
might be obtained with more traditional approaches, the QTVR approach has provided detailed site-specific insights into the design and management of the six
representative railway stations on the Valley Lines network. The QTVR approach
also provides potential scope in that the identical QTVR scenes can be shown to
other specific stakeholder groups (e.g., tourists, young, elderly, disabled, nonrail
user). A more detailed explanation of the wider findings have been discussed at
length elsewhere (Cozens et al. 2002; Cozens et al. 2003) and this article specifically
focuses on passengers waiting on the platform and the design characteristics of
the station shelter, identified in this study as being particularly problematic for rail
users. Various phased improvements are being implemented throughout the network and the replacement of the previous solid, low visibility brick shelters with
high visibility transparent shelters is nearing completion of its first phase and provides an early opportunity for evaluation and critical review of this particular CPTED
modification.
Visibility of and by others was mentioned by respondents in all the focus groups as
being a crucial dimension to their fears of crime. The proximity of others (e.g.,
people in nearby houses and those engaged in activities overlooking the railway
station) emerged as an important issue for those waiting on the platform.
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People feel safer on a station that other people can see. (Female Respondent 12)
Visibility is the key—you’ve got to feel safe, otherwise you’re not going to use it
are you? (F3)
Similarly, when waiting on the platform, visibility of and by other rail users was
regarded as inadequate. Significantly, 93 percent of females (compared to 53% for
males) stated that they experienced fear of crime when waiting on the platform at
night. Repeatedly, reference was made to the enclosed brick shelters, and respondents stated a marked preference for the high visibility transparent shelters that
they had noticed being introduced at some local bus stops.
Do something about the concrete shelter. (Male Respondent 8)
It’s enclosed on three sides…it would be better if they had the new clearer ones…
like the bus shelters. (M19)
It smells like a toilet— and even looks like one! (F20)

Figure 2. A Typical Brick Shelter Found on a Valley Lines Railway Station
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Clearly, visibility to others and opportunities for surveillance of the station platform are currently severely limited. The enclosed nature of the brick shelter encourages congregating youths who are not subject to any formal or informal surveillance by rail staff, rail users, or community members while concealed inside the
shelter.
I don’t like that brick shelter— it’s just a gang hang-out, it needs to be see- through.
(F25)
It should never be totally enclosed like that. (F4)
Stations attract young people as places to go. In the brick shelters there’s underage drinking and drugs and stuff— it’s an ideal hangout. (F27)
Respondents were also mindful of the lack of visibility and coverage by CCTV when
waiting inside the brick shelters.
The cameras can’t see inside the brick shelter. (M14)
As soon as you get into the brick shelter you’re hidden. (M16)
Impaired visibility was clearly associated with fear of crime.
From inside that shelter I can’t see homes, roads, or other passengers— you need
to see and be seen—just for peace of mind, that’s all you need. (M21)
Valley Lines has initially installed transparent shelters at seven stations to evaluate
the effectiveness of this design modification in reducing fear of crime and increasing passenger flows. Figure 3 presents the transparent shelter design, which considerably enhances the opportunities for surveillance of the station by passengers
waiting for trains and the visibility of the waiting passengers to others in the vicinity.
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Figure 3. Transparent Shelter

That transparent shelter is tidy— you can see all around. (F6)
I feel much safer in transparent shelters where you know people can see you.(M1)
You can see people coming from everywhere. (M12)
Respondents also recognized that the transparent shelter would discourage youths
from gathering and indulging in antisocial behavior, alcohol consumption, and vandalism.
The kids don’t want to hang out in the glass shelters— they can be seen. (F17)
Most respondents clearly welcomed the enhanced opportunities for surveillance
that the transparent shelters provide.
That’s one of those new shelters you see…which are open and security-wise they
are better because if you can be seen, you don’t feel so unsafe. (F10)
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In a customer satisfaction survey of more than 2,000 respondents (Wales and Borders Trains 2002), 18 percent commented that they had noticed physical improvements at the stations (which had thus far been installed at only a minority of stations). However, at railway stations where the transparent shelters had been installed, 93 percent of respondents stated that they had noticed the recent improvements to the physical fabric. Furthermore, of those, 71 percent stated that
transparent shelters reduced their fear of crime due to improved visibility; being
able to see around-and-about at all times and also the enhanced potential to be
seen by others.

Conclusions
This study indicates that QTVR is clearly useful customer-focused approach for
investigating crime and passengers’ fear of crime at railway stations. Brick shelters
were repeatedly identified as being problematic by rail users and transparent shelters clearly represent a significant improvement for rail users. Undoubtedly, the
installation of transparent shelters has been well received by rail passengers as a
surveillance-enhancing design feature that can tackle crime and the fear of crime.
Indeed, the findings suggest that if transparent shelters work to enhance surveillance and visibility and to reduce fear of crime, careful consideration should be
given to other design features that might impair or reduce visibility. Indeed, in the
after-dark railway station environment visibility is certainly reduced and a study of
lighting at Valley Lines stations is now underway. A more extensive, longer-term
study of the perceived impact of design and management changes is essential to
verify these positive preliminary findings, but the approach adopted and the results thus far seem most encouraging.
Significantly, the Valley Lines network has witnessed an increase in annual passenger flows of some 33 percent during the period 2000–2003. It would not be inappropriate to suggest that a significant proportion of this increase in patronage is
attributable to Valley Lines’ ongoing passenger-led station improvement program.
Indeed, the new high visibility shelters not only reduced fear of crime but appear
to have also produced higher levels of consumer confidence, and in the short term,
higher levels of patronage.
In relation to the transparent shelters, it will certainly be interesting to gauge how
long these continue to provide “shelter from the storm” and whether the perennial
problem of vandalism on the railways reinvents itself in new guises. The train oper35
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ating company Wales and Borders Trains (2003) recently announced that during
the next 12 months, rail passengers in Wales will benefit from a £2.5m Welsh Assembly Government grant for improvements to railway stations. This funding will
allow Wales and Borders Trains to modernize railway station facilities and enhance
passengers’ safety and in doing so, continue to increase levels of patronage. Welsh
Assembly Environment Minister, Ms. S. Essex (Wales and Borders Trains 2003) stated,
“This funding will improve essential facilities such as toilets, waiting rooms and
shelters, and better passenger safety will be tackled through CCTV and lighting.”
Indeed, prioritizing expenditure on physical improvements will be a crucial task
for the train operating companies and they are now beginning to acquire a more
detailed understanding of passengers’ fear of crime at railway stations in which the
use of technologies, such as QTVR, is making a substantial contribution.

36

Tackling Crime and Fear of Crime While Waiting at Britain’s Railway Station

References
Brantingham, P. J, P. L. Brangtingham, and P. S. Wong. 1991. How public transit
feeds private crime: Notes on the Vancouver “Skytrain” experience. Security
Journal 2, 2: 91–95.
Carr, K. and G. Spring. 1993. Public transport safety: A community right and a communal responsibility. Crime Prevention Studies 1, 147–155.
Clarke R. V. G. 1996. Editorial introduction: Crime and the economics of mass transit. In Clarke, ed., Preventing Mass Transit Crime. Crime Prevention Studies Volume 6, 1–4. Willow Tree Press, New York.
Cozens, P. M. 2002. Exploring crime and the fear of crime within the railway environment. Public Transport International 51: 20–24.
Cozens, P. M., D. Hillier, and G. Prescott. 2001. Crime and the design of residential
property. Exploring the theoretical background. Property Management 19, 2:
136–164.
Cozens. P. M., J. Waters, and R. H. Neale. 2002. A virtual reality approach to personal safety and the design of built environment facilities. Proceedings of the
ARCOM (Association of Researchers in Construction Management) 18th Annual
Conference. Volume 2: 461–473.
Cozens, P. M., R. H. Neale, J. Whitaker, and D. Hillier. 2003. Investigating personal
safety at railway stations using ‘virtual reality’ technology. Facilities 21, 7/8:
188–194.
Crime and Disorder Act. 1998. Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Crown Copyright,
London.
Crime Concern and Transport and Travel Research. 1997. Perceptions of safety from
crime on public transport. Crime Concern and Transport and Travel Research
for DETR.
Crowe, T. D. 2000. Crime prevention through environmental design: Applications of
architectural design and space management concepts, 2nd ed. ButterworthHeinemann.Oxford.
DETR. 1998a. Personal security on public transport. Guidelines for operators. DETR
Mobility Unit. Crown Copyright, London.

37

Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2004

DETR. 1998b. Secure Stations Scheme. Guidelines for Operators. Crown Copyright,
London.
DETR. 2000. Transport 2010. The Stationery Office, London.
DETR. 2001. PPG13 Transport. Home Office, London.
DOE. 1994. Planning out crime circular 5/94. Home Office, London.
Eck, J. E. 1997. Preventing crime at places. Chapter 7 in Sherman, L.W, D. Gottfredson,
D. MacKenzie, J. Eck, P. Reuter, and S. Bushway, Preventing crime: What works,
what doesn’t, what’s promising. Report to the United States Congress, Prepared
for the National Institute of Justice.
Guardian. 2002. Police report rise in rail crime. Guardian Website http://
www.guardian.co.uk/Print/0%2C3858%2C4467190%2C00.html. Visited 10/03/03.
Hamilton, K., and L. Jenkins. 2000. A gender audit for public transport: A new policy
for tackling social exclusion. Urban Studies 37, 19: 1793–1800.
Ham-Rowbottom, K. A., R. Gifford, and K. T. Shaw. 1999. Defensible space theory
and the police: Assessing the vulnerability of residences to burglary. Journal of
Environmental Psychology 19: 117–129.
Home Office. 2000. Criminal statistics, England and Wales. Government Statistical
Service, London.
Hunter, R. D and C. Ray Jeffery. 1997. Preventing convenience store robbery through
environmental design. In Clarke, R.V., ed. Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies, 2 ed. Harrow and Heston, New York, 191–199.
Jacobs, J. 1961. The death and life of great American cities. Vintage, New York.
Kenney, D. J. 1987. Crime, fear and the New York subways: The role of citizen action.
Praeger, New York.
La Vigne, N. G. 1996. Safe transport: Security by design on the Washington Metro.
In Clarke, ed. Preventing Mass Transit Crime. Crime Prevention Studies Volume
6: 163–198.
La Vigne, N. G. 1997. Visibility and vigilance: Metro’s situational approach to preventing subway crime. National Institute of Justice–Research in Brief. U.S. Department of Justice.

38

Tackling Crime and Fear of Crime While Waiting at Britain’s Railway Station

Lashmar, P. 2001. Robberies on the rise in Britain’s dark, dangerous train stations.
Independent, 30 April, p7.
Levine, N., M. Wachs, and E. Shiraz. 1986. Crime at bus stops: A study of environmental factors. Journal of Architectural and Planning Research 3: 339–362.
Loukaitou-Sideris, A. and T. Banerjee. 1994. Form follows transit? The Blue-line
Corridor’s development potential. Los Angeles, CA: Department of Urban Planning, University of California, Los Angeles.
Madelin, K. 2003. The research connection. The Engineer. March, 31–34.
Maguire, M., R. Morgan, and R. Reiner, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Criminology
(2nd ed.). Oxford: OUP.
Mirrlees-Black, C., T. Budd, S. Partridge, and P. Mayhew. 1998. The 1998 British crime
survey. HMSO, London.
Newman, O. 1973. Defensible space: People and design in the violent city. Architectural Press, London.
Parliamentary Travel Safe Committee. 1998. Brisbane’s Citytrain Network–Part–
Passenger Security. Report No.24.Legislative Assembly of Queensland.
Pengwyn Services. 2001. Customer Satisfaction Survey, 2001. Cardiff Rail Company
Ltd.
Poyner, B. 1988. Video cameras and bus vandalism. Journal of Security Administration 11, 4–51.
Schneider, R. H. and T. Kitchen. 2002. Planning for crime prevention: A transatlantic
perspective. Routledge, London and New York.
Sloan-Hewitt, M., and G. L. Kelling. 1997. Subway graffiti in New York City: Gettin’
up vs. meanin’ it and cleanin’ it.” In Clarke, R.V., ed. Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies, 2nd ed. Harrow and Heston, New York, pp. 242–
282.
Tijerino, R. 1998. Civil spaces: A critical perspective of defensible space. Journal of
Architectural Planning Research 15, Part 4 (Winter): 321–337.
Valley Lines. 2001. Valley Lines network map. Valley Lines, Cardiff.
Wales and Borders Trains. 2002. Customer satisfaction survey. Unpublished, Wales
and Borders Trains, Cardiff.
39

Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2004

Wales and Borders Trains. 2003. All change for railway stations, states Ms. Sue Essex
(Welsh Assembly, Environment Minister). Press Release, W030228-TP. 5 March.

About the Authors
PAUL COZENS (pmcozens@yahoo.com) is a consultant for crime prevention through
environmental design (CPTED) and principal policy officer at the Office of Crime
Prevention, Department of the Premier and Cabinet, Western Australia. He obtained a first class BA (Hons) degree in sustainable environments and a Ph.D. in
crime and design, both from the University of Glamorgan, UK. He has experience
as a CPTED researcher and consultant, conducting major projects for a national
community regeneration partnership and a national railway network. Dr. Cozens’
research on CPTED and designing out crime, lighting, CCTV and creating sustainable urban communities has appeared in more than 50 academic and trade journals. He is an ICA-certified CPTED practitioner.

RICHARD NEALE is professor of construction management and head of the School
of Technology at the University of Glamorgan (UK). As head of the School of Technology, Dr. Neale promotes the institute’s broadly-based curriculum, which embraces built environment, design, engineering, human geography, and mathematics. He established the Wales Transport Research Centre and the Suzy Lamplugh
Trust Research Institute for Personal Safety. Prior to joining the university, Dr. Neale
worked with civil engineers and construction contractors. He received an MSc in
construction management. His research interests include the practical application
of construction management theory. He has authored in more than 100 publications and has undertaken assignments for UN agencies in 10 developing countries.

JEREMY WHITAKER is commercial director of Wessex Trains and external professor at
the University of Glamorgan. He is a chartered marketer with a postgraduate diploma in marketing. Dr. Whitaker is a founding member of the Wales Transport
Research Centre and former director of National Rail Enquiry Service. He is active
in the Association of Train Operating Companies where he has overseen the introduction of National Ticket on Departure (ToD) and is currently chairing the project
board for the implementation of the industry’s new fares system. Dr. Whitaker
graduated from Birmingham University with a first in engineering and economics.

40

Tackling Crime and Fear of Crime While Waiting at Britain’s Railway Station

DAVID HILLIER is head of geography in the School of Technology, University of
Glamorgan (UK). He has published on topics as diverse as urban regeneration, the
changing retailscape of the British city, the Slow City movement, lighting levels in
the British city, use of CCTV in town and city centers, and on the relationship between the design of the urban environment and its criminogenic capacity. His teaching focuses on the evolution of the post-industrial city.

41

Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2004

42

Overcoming Financial and Insitutional Barriers to TOD

Overcoming Financial and
Institutional Barriers to TOD:
Lindbergh Station Case Study
Eric Dumbaugh

Abstr
act
Abstract
While transit-oriented development has been embraced as a strategy to address a
wide range of planning objectives, from minimizing automobile dependence to improving quality of life, there has been almost no examination into the practices that
have resulted in the actual development of one. This study examines Atlanta’s
Lindbergh Station TOD to understand how a real-world development was able to
overcome the substantial development barriers that face these developments. It finds
that transit agencies have a largely underappreciated ability to overcome the land
assembly and project financing barriers that have heretofore prevented the development of these projects. Further, because they provide a means from converting capital investment into positive operating returns, this study finds that development
projects provide transit agencies with a unique means of overcoming the capital bias
in funding apportionment mechanisms. This latter factor will undoubtedly play a
key role in increasing the popularity of transit-agency sponsored TOD projects in the
future.
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Introduction
Transit-oriented development (TOD), which seeks to encourage transit and walking as a travel mode by clustering mixed-use, higher density development around
transit stations (Calthorpe 1993), has become popularly embraced as a strategy
for mitigating a host of social ills, such as sprawl, automobile dependence, travel
congestion, air pollution, and physical health, among others (Belzer and Autler
2002; Cervero et al. 2002; Frank et al. 2003). Despite these potential benefits, there
has been little examination into the development practices that result in the actual occurrence of a TOD.
The literature addressing the topic of TOD implementation typically details developmental and regulatory barriers to TOD (Boarnet and Compin 1999; Belzer and
Autler 2002; Leinberger 2001; SMARTRAQ 2001; Cervero et al. 2002), and then
concludes by providing general guidelines and best practices, such as “Collaboration Is Key” (Renne and Wells 2002) or “Revise Development Codes” (Arrington
2003). While such “best practices” are useful as a conceptual starting point for
encouraging TOD, they fail to consider the complicated financial and institutional
arrangements needed to finance and construct these developments.
The absence of real-world project information is widely recognized as one of the
major deficiencies in the literature on TODs. Indeed, the most comprehensive literature review on TODs to date, published by the Transit Cooperative Research
Program, concludes that:
Research into the institutions, politics, methods, and impacts of TOD and TJD
[transit joint development] is needed now more than ever... There is a huge
pent-up demand for best-case practices that others can imitate and learn from.
(Cervero et al. 2002, 89)
To help address this research need, this study provided a detailed examination into
the financial and institutional practices that led to the development of a TOD
project. Specifically sought is an understanding of TOD implementation strategies
that can be used to inform development strategies in other regions. For many advocates of transit-oriented design, this information is essential for understanding
how to move TOD from a development concept to a development reality.
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Study Methodology
This research employs a case study approach to better understand how project
finance and land assembly barriers can be meaningfully overcome in practice. By
examining a real-world development, this study is able to move beyond theoretical best practices. Nevertheless, the use of a case study as a research approach
necessarily raises questions regarding the appropriateness of the identified case in
meeting the stated research objective, as well as the ability to generalize from an
individual observation. Both of these research concerns are addressed below.

Case Selection
Several factors led to my selection of the Lindbergh Station TOD for this analysis.
First, many of the projects that have been heralded as TOD successes are in fact
nothing of the sort. They either lack functional integration to nearby transit service, and thus are, in fact, “transit-related developments” (Belzer and Autler 2002)
or else they, like Laguna West, were designed to support future transit service, but
currently lack a transit connection (Calthorpe 1993). While such developments
are notable, they cannot be adequately understood as models on which to understand TOD implementation since they are not fully realized TODs. Once one distinguishes these types of developments from actual TODs, very few representative
developments are available for study.
Second, MARTA’s Lindbergh Station Development was the first development selected to pilot the Federal Transit Administration’s 1997 Policy on Transit Joint
Development, giving it intrinsic value for this analysis. The FTA’s policy revisions
were intended to encourage transit agencies to take a more active role in the development of station-area lands. Lessons emerging from this pilot project would
seem to be of great practical importance for other transit agencies throughout the
United States.
Third, while several studies on transit-oriented developments have asserted that
transit agencies can play an important role in the implementation of these projects
(Porter 1997; Cervero et al. 2002), there has been little examination into the nature
of this role. As described in the literature, this role is largely that of the advocate
(Cervero et al. 2002; Belzer and Autler 2002). These assertions are principally made
on theoretical grounds, rather than from detailed examinations into the practices
of transit agencies. I believed that a focused study on a transit agency-sponsored
project was essential for adequately understanding the role these agencies could
play.
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Finally, and perhaps decidingly, my institutional connections with the planning
agencies in the Atlanta region afforded me a high level of access to the key actors
involved in making the decisions that resulted in the Lindbergh TOD. Beyond their
willingness to both be interviewed and to respond to subsequent follow-up questions, these individuals also allowed me to review highly sensitive internal documentation and materials, materials which would have otherwise been impossible
to obtain. Access to this material allowed me to understand this development in a
level of detail that would have been impossible in other areas.

Addressing Generalizability
Generalizability is often the major design shortcoming of case study research (Yin
2003). To ensure that the results of this study are relevant to other areas and regions, this study is conducted with an eye toward identifying those policies and
practices that could be transferred to address similar barriers in other regions. In
this study, the Lindbergh development was examined to determine the following:


What were the development incentives of the project sponsor?



How did the project overcome land assembly barriers?



How did the project overcome financial barriers?



What financial and ridership benefits does the project create for its publicsector partners, if any?

The answers to these questions are of great relevance to other areas that are contemplating a TOD development strategy.

The Lindbergh Station TOD
In 1997, the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) announced
its plan to develop a 47-acre site surrounding its Lindbergh Station into a transitoriented development. The site seemed ideal for the project. Located along Piedmont Avenue between the City of Atlanta’s rapidly growing Midtown and Buckhead
districts, and with superior access to the region’s downtown and Perimeter Center
employment hubs, the parcel appeared ripe for redevelopment. At the time of the
announcement, the Lindbergh station area consisted of aging, low-density strip
development, and MARTA’s landholdings around its Lindbergh station was serving
primarily as a park-and-ride lot for local commuters (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. The Lindbergh Station-Area (top) and
Its Location in the City of Atlanta (bottom)

While the project plan went through several iterations, MARTA’s final plan for the
site would include roughly 2.5 million square feet of commercial office space, 2.2
million of which was reserved for BellSouth, 300,000 square feet of retail, roughly
1,300 residential units, as well as a 160-room hotel (see Figure 2 and Table 1).

47

Journal of Public Transportation, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2004

Table 1. Land-Use Elements of the Final Lindbergh TOD
Component
BellSouth Office
Speculative Office
Retail
Hotel

Size

Partner

2,200,000 sq ft
225,000 sq ft

BellSouth
Federal Realty

300,000 sq ft
160 rooms

Federal Realty
Federal Realty

Rental Residential

916 Units

Post Properties

For Sale Residential

382 Units

Post Properties

Figure 2. The Final Lindbergh Station Site Plan
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Overcoming Developmental Barriers
This study examines the Lindbergh TOD across four major areas. First, it identifies
the sponsor for the project, as well as their incentives for encouraging the development. Second, it considers how the project overcame the land assembly barriers
that hinder these developments. Third, it outlines the mechanism used to address
the capital infrastructure costs of the development’s financial barriers. Finally, this
study considers the financial benefits the project generates for its public-sector
partners in return for their investment in the development.

Project Sponsor Incentives
In the case of the Lindbergh development, MARTA was not only the champion of
the project, it was the project’s primary sponsor. MARTA’s interest in encouraging
TOD is obvious: Each additional rider increases the agency’s bottom line. The agency
has an inherent interest in encouraging station-area developments that funnel new
riders into the transit system. What makes MARTA’s involvement in the Lindbergh
development unique is that, for the first time, a transit agency took the primary
role in developing the properties surrounding a transit station.
The reason for this unique shift is not due to any unique innovation on the part of
MARTA itself, but instead due to recent revisions in federal policy. While the Common Grant Rule had previously prevented transit agencies from developing federally assisted properties for purposes other than those directly related to transit,1
the FTA had recently revised this policy to permit these landholdings to be developed into transit-oriented developments. MARTA’s landholdings around its
Lindbergh station—much of which had been acquired with federal aid—were suddenly available for development. Rather than use this regionally central location as
a park-and-ride lot, MARTA was suddenly presented with the opportunity of transforming it into a significant point of both transit origin and destination.
While MARTA’s interest in the project is clear, it leads to a broader consideration of
the role transit agencies can play in the development of similar projects. Considering the role of transit agencies more generally, it is obvious that they, more than
either local governments or private developers, are the logical sponsors of such
projects (Cervero et al. 2003). While private developers are motivated by net profit,
and municipalities by increased tax revenues, transit agencies receive a direct benefit from each new system rider. To successfully achieve the agency’ transit ridership objectives, transit agencies have a strong incentive to encourage mixed-use,
pedestrian-oriented developments at station ends that enable individuals to ac-
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complish a variety of travel objectives without the use of an automobile. Pedestrian-friendly design and the related benefits it can generate are consequently of
great practical importance to the agency’s measurement of success; any deviation
from these development objectives detracts from the agency’s overall performance.

Land Assembly
Not only did federal policy revisions provide MARTA with the incentive for undertaking joint development projects, they provided it with the means for overcoming land assembly barriers as well. Transit agencies typically accumulate excess landholdings as part of developing their regional transit system;2 the FTA’s Policy on
Transit Joint Development suddenly made these formerly “undevelopable” lands
available for development, thus, at least in part, removing major land assembly
barriers to TODs.
The use of these properties was not unrestricted, however. As a criterion for evaluating development projects, the FTA introduced the concept of highest and best
transit use. The concept is similar to the theory applied in conventional real estate
analyses, except transit effectiveness is factored into the analysis. As defined by the
FTA, the highest and best transit use is “that combination of residential, retail, commercial and parking space that results in the highest level of transit support from a
combination of project revenues and increased ridership” (Federal Register 1997).
While no minimum project benchmarks have been established, the FTA does require a proposed development to meet an informal three-part test (Marx 2002):
1. Is the development functionally related to transit?
2. Does the development generate revenue for the transit provider?
3. Does the development improve access to the system, accounting for the
affects of new riders?
In short, development projects that generate a net profit to the transit provider
and that demonstrate meaningful increases in system ridership are exempt from
federal repayment obligations. As a result, MARTA suddenly had a large tract of
developable land, and a strong incentive to develop it.
An interesting, and perhaps unrecognized aspect of the FTA’s joint development
policy was that it not only absolved transit agencies from their obligations for repaying the federal government for federally acquired properties, it also provided a
means for utilizing federal capital funds for acquiring new landholdings for TOD
projects as well. Since the policy revision regarded lands used for joint develop-
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ment projects as transit capital investments, transit agencies could now apply for
federal capital funding to acquire additional properties needed for a proposed TOD
project. Indeed, MARTA, as the first agency selected as part of the FTA’s pilot program for its joint development policy, utilized this flexibility to acquire $1.6 million
in new funds that were used not only for project planning, but also for the acquisition of 1.5 additional acres for the project (MARTA 1999).

Financing Mechanisms
Federal policy revisions gave MARTA both the incentive and the ability to undertake the Lindbergh development. What was by no means clear, however, were the
financial arrangements that would enable the development to be constructed.
Under MARTA’s development plan, the agency would finance the project’s
streetscape, sewer, and structured parking facilities, thereby absorbing the project’s
front-end capital needs, as well as most of the project’s risks. In return, MARTA’s
development partners agreed to sign 99-year ground leases on the property, and
to construct their buildings in conformity with MARTA’s master plan for the site.
To fund its share of this arrangement, the MARTA board of directors authorized an
$81 million bond issuance (Vespermann 2001). Thus, in one fell swoop—a simple
majority vote of its board of director—MARTA was able to bypass the financial
barriers that have traditionally made the financing and implementation of these
projects so difficult. While it is tempting to immediately herald this development
as a success, several questions emerge. First, what was the means by which MARTA
was able to make such a substantial public commitment without subjecting the
bond issuance to a public referenda? Second, what are the actual benefits that this
project creates for MARTA? Transit agencies are not principally land developers,
yet, in the case of the Lindbergh development, MARTA has elected to undertake a
project that the private sector, left to its own financing practices, would not.
This necessarily raises questions about the financial arrangement underpinning
this development. If the Lindbergh TOD is to serve as a model for subsequent
transit joint-development projects, what revenues does the project generate in
return for MARTA’s investment? The following sections detail what is perhaps of
greatest interest to TOD advocates. First, it examines the institutional mechanisms
that enabled MARTA to finance its share of this arrangement. And, second, it details the new ridership and developmental revenues that the project is expected to
generate in return for MARTA’s $81 million investment.
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Transit Agencies as Public Authorities
The key to understanding MARTA’s ability to finance requires an understanding of the historical creation of transit agencies. Transit service was originally
provided not by public agencies, but by private transit operators (Warner 1978;
Jackson 1985). The advent of the private automobile and the lower-density
development patterns that it generated made providing this service unprofitable, forcing private transit companies to discontinue service (Calthorpe 1993;
Duany et al. 2000; Glacel 1983; Jackson 1985). The concept of “public transit”
was the result of the realization that transit service was essential to meeting
regional mobility needs, and thus merited public subsidies to continue its operation. While the public sector could have decided to provide this service
directly or to contract this service to private operators, they instead opted to
create special “public authorities”3 that were authorized with the ability to
construct and operate transit systems.
Public authorities are unique institutions created through state enabling legislation. While they are funded through public revenues, they resemble private
corporations more than they do any purely public-sector entity. Public authorities are governed by a board of directors whose membership is typically
not determined through public proceedings such as a general election, but
through appointees specified in its enabling legislation (Axelrod 1992).4 Because of their semiprivate characteristics, the actions of public authorities are
typically not subject to public review unless they are explicitly required to do
so in their enabling legislation, or unless they use federal funds for a project
that has explicit public involvement requirements.
Despite their private-sector characteristics, the charters under which transit
authorities are created typically supply them with many of the powers reserved
for public agencies, including the ability to exercise eminent domain, to create
laws and establish a police force,5 as well as the ability to finance projects using
bonds backed by public revenues. Unlike municipalities however, transit authorities are not required to submit bond issuance to a public referendum
(Walsh 1978). In practice, as Robert Caro observed in The Power Broker, public
authorities have the ability to function as a “sovereign state” (623), making
transit authorities, such as MARTA, potentially powerful forces in regional development. Indeed, MARTA’s ability to synthesize its institutional power as a
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public authority is key to understanding its ability to finance the Lindbergh
TOD.
The major financial barrier to TODs, from the perspective of the private-sector developer, is that current financial evaluation methodologies, such as discounting and internal rate-of-return, favor short-term investments, typically
over periods of five to seven years. Because TODs have high front-end capital
costs, these developments typically take longer than seven years to mature,
making them undesirable from an institutional lender’s perspective (Leinberger
2001; Danielsen et. al., 1999; SMARTRAQ 2001).
As a public authority, MARTA is consequently able to use dedicated public
revenues to backstop low-interest bonds. Thus, the agency does not need to
conform to conventional lending practices to finance a project, nor does it
need to seek public approval for their use. MARTA can consequently finance
the Lindbergh development’s infrastructure, and hence most of its risks, thereby
offering its private-sector partners with the ability to distinguish their products in the market without accepting the corresponding risk associated with
substantial front-end infrastructure investments. While this resolves an important barrier to TODs, it does not ensure that the project is a meaningful
investment of public resources. The key question remains: What are MARTA’s
returns for this investment?

Project Benefits
Before analyzing the project’s investment returns, it is important to first specify
the sources of revenue the project will generate. First, and most obviously, MARTA’s
investment will generate revenues from ground leases and condominium sales.
Nevertheless, evaluating the project solely on the returns from these sources would
neglect MARTA’s real incentive in investing in the project—the generation of new
system riders. Correspondingly, the following analysis accounts for the projected
revenues that will occur from new system ridership in addition to land development revenues.
Financial Assumptions
Reviewing the financial practices that underpinned the Lindbergh development proved difficult. While MARTA staff was largely cooperative in providing
basic information on the Lindbergh project, contractual agreements with its
development partners prohibited MARTA from disclosing the details of its
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financial arrangements. Still, certain elements, such as the application it submitted to the FTA and its development-phasing plan, were public record, and
MARTA was willing to provide its financial assumptions regarding transit ridership, as well as its anticipated aggregate revenues for the project at completion. Using these data sources, it was possible to approximately reconstruct
the development’s financial model.
Project revenues from new transit ridership were approximated by making
basic assumptions about the number of employees and residents for each of
the project elements, as well as their trip-making behavior, 6 while accounting
for vacancy rates (Table 2), and then using MARTA’s transit capture7 (Table 3)
and farebox assumptions to arrive at transit ridership revenues. MARTA’s financial assumptions assumed that the base fare of $1.75 would be reduced by
25 percent to account for the use of special fare rates, such as monthly passes.
Further, MARTA projected a consistent 2 percent annual fare increase through
the life of the project.
Table 2. Ridership Assumptions
Project Element
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Vacancy
Rate

Unit

Annual
Travel Days

Annual
Trips

BellSouth Office

0%

150 s.f. per employee

244

7,157,496

Office
Retail

5%
5%

150 s.f. per employee
52 persons per 1,000 s.f.

244
360

695,400
11,737,440

Hotel
Residential

5%
5%

1.1 persons per room
1.3 persons per unit

360
360

101,152
1,155,600
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Table 3. Estimated Transit Ridership for Trips Generated by the
Lindbergh TOD
Project Element

Element Size

Annual
Trips

Transit
Capture

Transit
Riders

Bellsouth Office
Speculative Office

2,200,000 sq ft
225,000 sq ft

7,157,496
695,400

30%
10%

2,147,246
69,540

300,000 sq ft
160 rooms

11,737,440
101,152

5%
10%

586,872
10,152

1,298 units

1,155,600

10%

115,560

Retail
Hotel
Residential

The joint development application MARTA submitted to the FTA indicated its
intention to build 120 condominium units at the Lindbergh site, providing MARTA
with conservative sales proceeds of $5 million and placing the per unit proceeds at
$41,667. Later revisions to the development plan increased the number of units to
382. This analysis assumed that MARTA’s per unit sales proceeds remained unchanged; revenues from condominium sales were determined by multiplying by
$41,667 by the number of units scheduled to be sold each development year.
Once values for these data points were determined, deriving estimates of ground
lease revenues was simply a matter of subtracting transit ridership estimates and
condominium sales from total revenues. While such an approach did not permit
the revenues from specific project components to be identified, it nevertheless
provided an approximate measure of aggregate revenues derived from ground
leases.8

Project Revenues
To finance the Lindbergh TOD, MARTA issued $81 million in bonds to be repaid
over a 30-year period at 4 percent interest, compounded annually. Because MARTA
did not disclose the time periods at which these bonds would be issued, the following analysis assumes that the full $81 million was issued on day one, to be repaid in equal annual payments of $4,684,238 over the 30-year period. Under this
accounting scheme, MARTA’s Lindbergh project will produce roughly $293 million, in 2001 dollars, of new revenue during the 30-year period over which the
project is financed. Less the cost of repaying the bonds, this provides MARTA with
almost $153 million in net new revenues (see Table 4). While such a return would
seem profitable, on the surface, the longer-term period over which these returns
are realized makes these benefits misleading. If one considers investing the same
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$4,684,238

$4,684,238
$4,684,238

$4,684,238
$4,684,238

$4,684,238
$4,684,238

$4,684,238
$4,684,238
$4,684,238

$4,684,238
$4,684,238

$4,684,238
$4,684,238

$4,684,238
$4,684,238

$4,684,238
$4,684,238

$4,684,238

2001

2002
2003

2004
2005

2006
2007

2008
2009
2010

2011
2012

2013
2014

2015
2016

2017
2018

2019

Bond Repayment

Year

Costs

$6,600,000

$6,600,000
$6,600,000

$6,600,000
$6,600,000

$5,138,281
$5,870,090

$3,683,025
$4,418,800

$1,955,806
$2,706,645
$3,455,965

$1,047,517
$1,813,262

$1,340,701
$730,321

$1,920,000
$1,401,326

$950,000

Ground Leases

$5,348,463

$5,140,776
$5,243,592

$4,941,154
$5,039,977

$4,749,282
$4,844,268

$4,550,950
$4,641,968

$3,797,783
$3,873,739
$3,951,214

$3,052,483
$3,113,533

$2,259,299
$2,979,679

$0
$1,278,674

$0

Ridership

$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$4,166,700
$0

$0
$0

$0
$3,000,024
$0

$0
$4,375,035

$0
$4,375,035

$0
$0

$0

Condo Sales

Estimated Revenues

$11,948,463

$11,740,776
$11,843,592

$11,541,154
$11,639,977

$14,054,264
$10,714,359

$8,233,974
$9,060,769

$5,753,590
$9,580,408
$7,407,179

$4,100,000
$9,301,830

$3,600,000
$8,085,035

$1,920,000
$2,680,000

$950,000

Annual Benefits

Table 4. Lindbergh TODs Revenues and Benefits

$7,264,225

$7,056,538
$7,159,354

$6,856,916
$6,955,739

$9,370,026
$6,030,121

$3,549,736
$4,376,531

$1,069,352
$4,896,170
$2,722,941

($584,238)
$4,617,592

($1,084,238)
$3,400,797

($2,764,238)
($2,004,238)

($3,734,238)

Net Annual Benefits

Estimated Benefits

$65,154,847

$50,731,268
$57,890,622

$36,718,991
$43,674,730

$23,831,955
$29,862,076

$10,085,398
$14,461,929

($1,083,450)
$3,812,721
$6,535,662

($6,770,393)
($2,152,801)

($9,586,952)
($6,186,155)

($6,498,476)
($8,502,714)

($3,734,238)

Net Profit
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$4,684,238
$4,684,238

$4,684,238
$4,684,238

$4,684,238
$4,684,238

$4,684,238
$4,684,238

$4,684,238
$4,684,238

$4,684,238

$140,527,140

2020
2021

2022
2023

2024
2025

2026
2027

2028
2029

2030

Total

$142,031,742

$6,600,000

$6,600,000
$6,600,000

$6,600,000
$6,600,000

$6,600,000
$6,600,000

$6,600,000
$6,600,000

$6,600,000
$6,600,000

$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$135,192,442 $15,916,794

$6,650,142

$6,391,909
$6,519,747

$6,143,703
$6,266,577

$5,905,136
$6,023,239

$5,675,832
$5,789,349

$5,455,433
$5,564,541

$293,140,978

$13,250,142

$12,991,909
$13,119,747

$12,743,703
$12,866,577

$12,505,136
$12,623,239

$12,275,832
$12,389,349

$12,055,433
$12,164,541

$152,613,838

$8,565,904

$8,307,671
$8,435,509

$8,059,465
$8,182,339

$7,820,898
$7,939,001

$7,591,594
$7,705,111

$7,371,195
$7,480,303

$152,613,838

$135,612,424
$144,047,934

$119,122,414
$127,304,754

$103,123,948
$111,062,949

$87,597,940
$95,303,050

$72,526,042
$80,006,345
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amount of money—$81 million—in a savings account that yielded 5 percent per
year, MARTA’s returns over the 30-year cycle would be $350 million—more than
twice that realized by the Lindbergh development.
When one considers the time value of money, the Lindbergh project looks even
less desirable. Assuming a generous discount rate of 4 percent and accounting for
discounted costs and revenues, the net present value of the project at the end of
the 30-year investment period is only about $71 million—$10 million less than
MARTA’s initial investment. MARTA’s returns also do not account for the inherent
risk of this development. These returns are based on the assumption that all of
MARTA’s revenue and ridership assumptions are realized. The failure of a project
element to generate the anticipated financial returns can have a dramatic impact
on the project’s overall profitability. MARTA, by financing the infrastructure costs
of this development, has largely underwritten most of the project’s risks. High-risk
projects should return high yields. Nevertheless, MARTA’s annual yield on this investment is, under the best circumstances, only about 2.1 percent—well below
national interest rates, despite the project’s risks.
An issue that potentially compounds this problem is the project’s performance
over the short term. For MARTA, the Lindbergh station development operates
largely at a loss through year six, although condominium sales help to offset the
magnitude. The project only begins showing net annual benefits in its seventh
year, and does not show a net profit until year nine (see Table 4). MARTA is currently running a $20 million operating deficit that has forced the agency to cutback route frequency and to eliminate underperforming routes (Atlanta Journal
Constitution 2001). The decision to undertake a major development project that
operates at a significant net loss during this critical period, and that ultimately
generates few long-term benefits seems at first confusing. Considering the relatively low yield on this high-risk investment, MARTA’s decision to invest in the development makes little sense.

Circumventing the Operations Dilemma
Clearly, the key factor in MARTA’s decision to undertake this project is not the
project’s overall profitability. The key lies in what the project secures for the agency—
a continuous, $13.3 million annual revenue stream that will continue indefinitely.
Development projects, such as Lindbergh, also provide a means to bypass the major financial hurdle that confronts transit agencies—operating costs. Understand58
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ing the financial significance of these projects requires a brief discussion of the
financial structures of transit agencies.
When transit authorities are created, their enabling legislation allocates public funds
to sustain them, but also specifies the apportionment that can be used for capital
purposes, such as constructing new rail lines or purchasing buses, and that which
can be applied to operations, which is the cost of actually providing transit service
on a day-to-day basis. MARTA, for example, is funded by a 1 percent local sales tax
that is split evenly between capital and operations9 (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. MARTA Funding Allocations

While system expansion, particularly new rail facilities, requires substantial capital
investments, transit authorities are able to pool significant resources together to
finance these projects. In addition to their direct public sources of revenue, transit
authorities are able to apply for federal funding, which covers up to 80 percent of
the actual capital acquisition costs. Beyond this federal contribution, transit agencies can also appeal to local governments to supply some or all of the additional 20
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percent local match required to fund the project. It is consequently possible (although unlikely) for a transit authority to fully finance a new capital project without using a dollar of dedicated agency funding.
Operations are more difficult to finance. While each dollar derived from ticket
sales can be used to cover operations, transit service always operates at a loss. Nationally, farebox revenue accounts for only 35 percent of the cost of operating transit
service (American Public Transportation Association 2003), and MARTA recovers
only 38 percent of its operating costs (Georgia Department of Transportation 2003).
Because operating costs are not recovered in farebox revenues, transit operators
are forced to identify alterative sources of revenue to cover the costs of operating
transit service. Development projects, such as the Lindbergh development, have
the ability to provide an important means of supplying this critical operating revenue.
For transit authorities, development projects, such as Lindbergh, are capital projects,
similar to the construction of a new rail line or the provision of a new bus route.
The revenues they generate, however, are operating dollars. As a consequence, even
a development operating at a net fiscal loss can provide a transit authority with
new funds that it can use to expand transit service (see Figure 4). To illustrate using
the Lindbergh project as an example, in 2003 the Lindbergh project operates at a
net loss of slightly more than $2 million dollars (see Table 4). From a private sector
perspective, the loss of $2 million dollars is a real loss. This is not the case with
MARTA’s Lindbergh project. The loss for MARTA is solely in capital dollars, which
are much easier to come by than operating dollars. Indeed, for a transit authority,
all capital projects operate at a loss—undertaking financially unprofitable investments are central to its business approach. What is unique about development
projects is that the losses are absorbed entirely on the capital side. While the project
may operate at a net loss during 2003, it nevertheless provides MARTA with $2.6
million dollars in new operating revenue—revenue that can be used to increase
service frequencies and reestablish routes it was forced to eliminate during its current budget shortfall.
Although this finding would appear to have surface appeal to TOD advocates, it
nevertheless leads to an unappealing conclusion. Transit agencies have a strong
incentive to undertake financially unprofitable development projects, a problem
that is exacerbated when transit agencies are running substantial operating deficits. Projects that are able to generate net positive operating revenues will com60
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Figure 4. Using Development Projects to Shift Capital Dollars
into Operating Dollars

pete favorably with other projects, such as new transit lines, which run at a continuous operating loss. Since the costs are absorbed on the capital side, and the
benefits realized on the operating side, the ultimate question for transit agencies is
not whether a development makes sound financial sense, but instead, what capital
losses are acceptable for new gains in operating revenue.

Subsequent Revisions to the Transit Joint Development Policy
While the FTA’s 1997 Policy on Transit Joint Development permitted transit authorities to use development revenues from federally assisted properties for either
capital or operating purposes, this freedom was later revoked when the policy was
formally incorporated into the U.S. Code through the Transportation Equity Act
for the 21st Century (TEA-21).10 TEA-21 indicated that “the net income from asset
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sales, uses, or leases (including lease renewals) under this section shall be used by
the recipient to reduce the gross project cost of other capital projects carried out
under this chapter” (49 U.S.C. 5334(g)). In other words, revenues coming from
federally assisted properties could no longer be used to subsidize operations.
While this would seem to resolve the issues surrounding capital losses for operating gains, the likely result of this policy revision is simply to encourage transit agencies to undertake creative site configurations. Agencies seeking to increase their
operating revenues have a powerful incentive to design these projects so that the
revenue-generating uses are located not on the individual parcels that work best
for the TOD as a whole, but instead on those parcels that provide the agency with
the greatest fiscal flexibility in the use of revenues. Further, if operating revenues
will not be generated through the development of the property, many agencies
may be unwilling to even consider undertaking the complicated and uncertain
federal review process needed to develop the property.
While there is no direct evidence to suggest that these considerations influenced
the configuration of MARTA’s Lindbergh development, it is nevertheless interesting that all of the project’s revenue-generating uses—its commercial, retail, and
residential elements—are located on properties acquired solely with local funds;
the federally funded properties are being used for nonrevenue-generating uses,
such as parking facilities and the relocation of the agency’s headquarters. The
Lindbergh development will consequently allow MARTA to apply the project’s revenue to cover operating expenses, should MARTA choose to do so.11 Regardless of
whether the Lindbergh site configuration was designed to circumvent federal requirements or simply a matter of coincidence, it is nevertheless clear that the decision to allow development on federally assisted properties, but to restrict the use
of the revenue, does little more than to provide transit agencies with a barrier to
optimizing the usefulness of a site.

Conclusions
The FTA’s 1997 Policy on Transit Joint Development is a milestone for advocates of
transit-oriented development. By relaxing federal restrictions on the use of transitarea properties, this policy gave transit agencies a powerful incentive to see station-area properties developed into TODs.
When one examines the actions MARTA undertook to realize this development,
the potentially central role of transit agencies in the implementation of these
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projects emerges. As a public authority, transit agencies can synthesize many of
the powers of the public sector to bring a project to fruition. First, transit agencies
often have excess, and in many cases substantial landholdings surrounding their
transit stations. The new ability to develop these properties can allow these agencies to bypass the land-assembly barriers that have previously made developing
TODs difficult. Further, where land assembly is needed, transit agencies often have
the ability to exercise eminent domain to acquire these properties, and may further be eligible to use federal funds for their acquisition.
Transit agencies can also overcome the second major barrier to TOD implementation: project finance. Transit agencies have the ability to use bond finance to cover
the capital infrastructure costs that have made these projects undesirable to the
private sector. In the case of the Lindbergh TOD, MARTA used $81 million in bond
finance to cover the streetscape, transit infrastructure, and structured parking costs
of the development.
While this significant, high-risk investment would seem to merit a correspondingly
high return, MARTA will receive only $153 million over the 30-year bond repayment period, assuming all of its financial assumptions are met. Accounting for the
time value of money, and applying a nominal 4 percent discount rate, the present
value of MARTA’s investment is only about $71 million—$10 million less than
MARTA’s initial investment.
The apportionment mechanisms applied to finance transit service explain MARTA’s
decision to undertake this development. While transit authorities were initially
created as a means for the public to underwrite the provision of transit service,
local and federal transit policies have been increasingly oriented toward reducing
operating subsidies. This mixed policy mandate—whether to treat transit as a public
good or to encourage it to be operationally efficient—currently makes transit agencies hard-pressed to identify projects that generate positive operating revenues
that can be used to cover the costs of operating socially desirable, but financially
unprofitable transit service.
TOD joint development projects, even while operating at a net fiscal loss, provide
transit agencies with a means for transferring capital dollars into this much-needed
operating revenue. Revenues from new riders, ground leases, and property sales
can be applied toward covering operating costs (assuming the agency can circumvent more recent federal restrictions on the use of these revenues). Thus, even a
development that is operating at a substantial net loss would appear to enhance
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overall transit performance since the development would generate new operating
revenue that advances the agency’s core mission—providing transit service.
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Endnotes
1

The Common Grant Rule, which outlined federal policy regarding the disposition
of property, relieved a transit agency of its obligation to the federal government
for projects developed for transportation projects, but was unclear about what
federal obligations, if any, would be required for federally funded properties used
for real estate development. To avoid potential federal obligations, transit authorities have correspondingly limited their joint development ventures to projects built
on the air rights of existing stations because the property is already being used for
the intended transportation purpose, fulfilling the agency’s obligation to the federal government under the Common Grant Rule.

2

MARTA has roughly 280 acres of excess station-area landholdings.

3

The concept of a public authority dates back to Elizabethan England. The term
“authority” is derived from the Parliamentary act that authorized them, which began with the phrase “Authority is hereby given…” (Caro 1974, p. 615).
4

MARTA’s board of directors includes appointees from the City of Atlanta, Fulton,
DeKalb, Gwinnett, and Clayton Counties, as well as members from the Georgia
Department of Transportation, Georgia Regional Transportation Authority, State
Properties Commission, and State Department of Revenue

5

MARTA’s police force, with 304 sworn officers, is the ninth largest in the State of
Georgia (Source: MARTA).

6

ITE’s Trip Generation Handbook is the conventional reference used to estimate
trip generation. This reference, however, pertains to automobile trips, and the
method used to derive its trip generation estimates are regression results based on
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observations of single-use suburban developments, rather than the more urbanized development models represented by transit-oriented developments (Ewing
and Dumbaugh 2001). To develop a more meaningful estimate of total trip generation, as well as to make the ridership assumptions transparent, I elected to develop independent estimates for each of the project elements that were consistent
with the developmental mix of the project. My assumptions further account for
travel variations associated with weekends, vacations, and holidays, factors not
considered in the regression results shown in the ITE Trip Generation Handbook.
7

While the Bellsouth component has what would appear to be a high transit capture rate, this assumption is supported by the characteristics of the development.
As part of a mediation agreement with the neighborhood groups, BellSouth agreed
to undersupply its on-site parking, forcing a third of its employees to use an alternate mode to work. To further encourage transit use, Bellsouth is combining transit pass subsidies with parking fees. Under the Metro plan, a monthly parking permit will cost $60 per month, while a transit pass, after Bellsouth subsidies, will cost
$12. BellSouth’s North Avenue building, built on the air rights of MARTA’s North
Avenue Station and employing a similar combination of parking restrictions and
transit pass subsidies, currently has a 30 percent transit capture rate (Gilbert 2001;
Vespermann 2002).

8

MARTA provided me with a spreadsheet outlining their aggregate revenues
through 2007, as well as its aggregate revenue for the build-out year of 2013. Revenues from ground leases through 2007 could consequently be determined by
simply subtracting my estimates of condominium sales and ridership revenue from
total revenues. To determine ground lease revenues for the 2007–2013 period, I
estimated the sum of the difference between known ridership and sales revenues
from the total revenues for the period, and then distributed it equally along each
year of this period. While the distributions of ground lease revenues doesn’t exactly match the development phasing cycle, this approach should not affect the
accuracy of the results presented.

9

To help minimize MARTA’s current operating deficit, the state legislature recently
adjusted this apportionment to allow MARTA to flex up to an additional 10 percent of state sales tax revenues for operating purposes.

10

The federal government reauthorizes transportation funding through a multiyear
legislative act. The two most recent transportation reauthorization packages, ISTEA
and TEA-21, have been funded for six-year intervals.
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11

According to Paul Vespermann, former director of Transit-Related Developments,
increasing system operating revenues is indeed the primary objective of this development (2002).
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Abstr
act
Abstract
This research examines the impacts of a number of traffic parameters on the effectiveness of a Transit Signal Priority (TSP) application. TSP is tested with the 98 B-line
rapid buses along Granville Street in the City of Vancouver as a case study. VISSIM, a
micro-simulation software (PTV 2002), is used to simulate TSP operation on the corridor. The traffic parameters studied include: bus approach volume, cross street volume/capacity (v/c) ratio, bus headway, bus stop location, bus check-in detector location, left turn condition, and signal coordination. Based on results from these experiments, recommendations are provided for TSP application on Granville Street. In
general, it is found that a TSP application would be most effective under a traffic
condition that has moderate-to-heavy bus approach volume, little or no turning volume hindering bus movement, slight-to-moderate cross street v/c ratio, farside bus
stop, and signal coordination for traffic running in the peak direction.
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Introduction
Transit Signal Priority (TSP) is an Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) measure
that modifies the normal signal operation process to better accommodate transit
vehicles. It aims to reduce the delay and travel time of transit vehicles, thereby
increasing the quality of a transit service; meanwhile, it attempts to provide these
benefits with minimal impact on other road users and cross street traffic in particular. TSP has been widely tested and deployed around the world, especially in
the United States and Europe, as a tool to improve transit performance. However,
previous research has shown that the impacts and effectiveness of a TSP application is subjective and depends on its surrounding traffic environment (such as signal timing settings, congestion levels, etc.). Consequently, it is important to study
the influences of various traffic and transit parameters on the impacts and effectiveness of a TSP application.
This research studied the effects of seven traffic and transit parameters on the
effectiveness of TSP. These parameters include: bus approach volume, cross street
volume/capacity (v/c) ratio, bus headway, bus stop location, bus check-in detector
location, left turn condition, and signal coordination. The 98 B-Line bus route, along
the Granville Street corridor, Vancouver, British Columbia, is used as a case study.
Based on the results, some generic guidelines and recommendations for TSP applications are proposed.

Previous Work
Several studies investigated the relationship between the effectiveness of a TSP
application and the surrounding traffic environment. The studied traffic parameters can be categorized into four main areas: vehicular volume, bus headway, bus
stop locations, and signal coordination.
Garrow and Machemehl (1998) used CORSIM to simulate several green extension
measures on the Gaudalupe corridor in Austin, Texas. They reported that there
would be a severe negative impact on the cross-street traffic if the cross-street
saturation level is above 1.0 with a 10-second green extension, or if the cross-street
saturation level is above 0.9 with a 20-second green extension. Under these conditions, they reported that the cross-street traffic would require 2 to 3 cycles to recover. Balke, Dudek and Urbanik (2000) examined the impacts of a proposed “intelligent bus priority concept” on the bus and general traffic performance at bus
approach v/c ratios of 0.50, 0.80 and 0.95. Their results illustrated that the intelli72
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gent priority system could improve bus travel time by more than 25% at three bus
approach v/c ratios; meanwhile, it slightly reduced the travel time of general traffic
running on or opposite to the bus approach. However, Balke, Dudek and Urbanik
also reported that the proposed system would have a substantial negative impact
on the average stop delay of traffic traveling on the non-priority approaches with
v/c levels greater than 0.95.
Little work had addressed the question of optimal bus headway for TSP operations. Khasnabis and Rudraraju (1997) examined the possible consequences of different headways on a TSP operation. A major bus route in Ann Arbor, Michigan
was selected for demonstration and was simulated using NETSIM. Route-level analysis illustrated that a 10-minute headway would produce the highest effectiveness
in reducing delay of the target direction and both directions of the main street.
They also reported that if a reduction in the delay of the cross street or the combined main street and cross street was the objective, a 7.5-minute headway would
be considered as the best alternative. Agrawal, Waller and Ziliaskopoulos (2002)
examined the impact of bus frequency on a TSP application. From a 30-minute
simulation, they reported the following observations on the impact of bus frequency:


Total system travel times of “no preemption” strategy and “preemption”
strategy converge when the number of buses rises above 30 per 30 minutes.



The least difference in total system travel times with and without preemption was observed at a bus frequency of 15 per 30 minutes or 2-minute
headway. The authors claimed that the difference did not remain constant
at a higher bus frequency because of the vehicle route changing that occurred after preemptions.



The benefit from preemption on bus trip time increased when there were
fewer buses; above approximately 20 buses per 30 minutes, the benefit
decreased and leveled off.

With regard to bus stop location, there was a clear preference for the use of farside
bus stops for the implementation of active TSP, for which real-time detections of
buses are required. This is because the uncertain passenger loading and unloading
time at a near-side bus stop would increase the uncertainty in predicting arrival
time of a bus at an intersection (Daniel 1997). It was also believed that a far-side
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bus stop could maximize the efficiency of a signal priority operation, as there would
be less influence from the dwell time at the bus stop (Huffman, et al. 1998).
Several studies investigated the effect of incorporating transit signal priority into a
coordinated network. Skabardonis (2000) proposed that transit signal priority
should only be granted if there is sufficient spare green time in a signal cycle. This
would mean that little or no transit vehicles would be given priority along a congested corridor or during the peak hours. According to Skabardonis (2000), the
spare green time was computed as:

where
Gi = green time for phase i,
Xi = degree of saturation of the critical link in phase i, and
N = total number of phases in a cycle.

Chatila and Swenson (2001) proposed to set the maximum green extension time
to 20% (or one-fifth) of the cycle length. To return to coordination, every 5th second in the cycle is skipped until the local clock (with adjusted time for green extension) and the master clock (with original reference time) are back in synchronization. Whereas, Duerr (2000) attempted to use a sophisticated algorithm called
DARVIN (with static optimization by Genetic Algorithm and dynamic adaptation
by Neural Network) to minimize the interference between public transit vehicles
and other vehicles and to maintain the existing signal coordination as much as
possible.

Methodology
As described earlier, the main objective of this article is to investigate the impact of
various traffic and transit parameters on the effectiveness of TSP. To achieve this,
Transit Signal Priority (TSP) application of the 98 B-line rapid transit buses along
Granville Street in the City of Vancouver is used as a case study and is simulated by
VISSIM.
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Experiment Site
The Granville Street corridor, where the 98 B-Line buses run, is one of the busiest
traffic and transit corridors in the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD).
The studied section along the Granville Street corridor stretches approximately
6km, from Broadway to 70th Avenue. All traffic data are based on morning peak
period data of year 2000. Granville Street morning peak hour entering volumes are
around 2,000 vehicles per hour (Veh/hr) and 1,000 Veh/hr in the northbound and
southbound directions, respectively. The 98 B-Line buses operate in mixed traffic
at 10-minute headways during the morning peak period. There are 19 signalized
intersections along the section.
The B-Line bus check-in detectors are located approximately 100 meters from the
intersection stop bars for real-time detection of the buses. Five on-street bus stops
for the 98 B-Line are placed on each Granville Street approach. Most of them are
on the farside (i.e., downstream) of the intersections, except the northbound bus
stop at the intersection of Granville Street and Broadway where a nearside bus
stop is placed because of a high transit stop demand that already exists on the
farside of the intersection. The TSP strategies experimented in this study are:
(i) Green extension: Extension of the green time when a bus checks in during
the bus-approach green phase and cannot check out before the original
green phase elapsed. The green phase for the bus would be extended until
either the bus checks out or when the maximum green extension of 14
seconds is reached, whichever comes first. Beyond the 14-second green
extension, the green phase of the bus-approach phase would end. To maintain coordination, the cross street green time reduces accordingly after a
green extension call.
(ii) Red truncation (or Early Green): The green time of the cross street phases
would be truncated (or shortened) when a bus checks in during the busapproach red phase, subjected to the required flash don’t walk (FDW) time
and a 3-second minimum walk time of the pedestrian phase (conflicting to
the TSP-eligible bus approaches); and
(iii) Restriction of TSP calls in two successive cycles.
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VISSIM Simulation and Calibration
VISSIM, a micro-simulation software, is used to simulate TSP operation on the
Granville Street corridor. VISSIM has a number of features that make it a useful
tool for modeling transit operation and transit priority:
1. VISSIM allows the development of user-defined signal logics to test different TSP strategies. The user-defined signal logics are coded with VAP, a Clike programming language that offers traffic-related functions such as detector calls, switching of signal phases, and transit phasing (PTV 2002)
2. VISSIM allows the assignment of detailed priority rules to model yielding
movements at signalized and non-signalized intersections.
3. VISSIM has a wide range of user-customizable output files for measures-ofeffectiveness such as volume, mean speed, travel times, delay, queue lengths,
and number of stops. Detailed signal records can also be logged.
As with every modeling exercise, a calibration process of the base network is performed. A geometric network calibration is performed by looking at the VISSIM
graphical user interface for any unusual behavior of the traffic, which may be due
to inexact coding of the network construction or traffic signal logics. Additionally,
the model is calibrated to isolate unrelated traffic factors, which could influence
the impact of the studied traffic parameters.
The VISSIM network was compared with the real-life network. The existing geometric conditions, actual input volumes, and actual signal timings on the Granville
Street corridor were used as the base of the model.

VISSIM Modeling
After calibration, a traffic simulation model, named “NoTAC,” is developed as the
base model (with no TSP) of the 98 B-Line buses on Granville Street.
Since the goal of this article is to investigate the individual impact of traffic parameters on TSP effectiveness, the NoTAC model assumes No Turning to and from
Granville Street, no Actuation from pedestrians at the pedestrian signals (or half
signals), and no turning from the Cross Streets. Two-phase fixed time signals are
tested along the corridor. In addition, it neglects actual gradient of the corridor,
actual exclusive HOV and bus lanes, and actual on-street parking on Granville Street
during the morning peak hours. These assumptions create a hypothetical case that
eliminates factors that might affect performance, and is used as a base for comparison and for evaluating one traffic variable at a time.
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Total simulation time is 1 hour and 15 minutes, including a normalization period
of 15 minutes at the beginning to fill the network with vehicles, and a simulation
period of 1 hour to collect data for analyses. Each experiment is performed with
five different random seeds to account for the stochastic traffic input. This is required to ensure the validity and stability of the results.
Results from the five simulation runs are averaged using a “Trimmed Average” approach, which excludes the highest and the lowest results of the runs, then averaging the remaining. This aims to reduce the effect of randomness in the simulation
results. The trim-averaged simulation results are used to test the sensitivities of
TSP impacts or effectiveness to the studied parameters.

Evaluation
Two measures of effectiveness (MOEs) used in the evaluations are the impact of
TSP and the green extension success rate. The impact of TSP compares the B-Line
bus and/or cross street performance (i.e., travel time or delay) with and without
TSP implementation; and the green extension success rate measures the rate at
which a bus might clear the intersection successfully with a green extension. Additionally, results of the simulations are presented in one of the two levels of aggregation: corridor-level presents the traffic performance along the Granville Street corridor, and approach-level focuses on the traffic performance on an approach to an
intersection.

Bus Approach Volume (Corridor-Level)
The B-Line buses operate at a default headway of 10 minutes and the Granville
Street (or bus approach) volumes considered for this experiment are 500, 1,000,
1,500, 2,000, 2,500, and 2,700 veh/hr/3-lanes. These Granville Street volumes represent average v/c ratios from 0.2 to 1.0 (i.e., at capacity). The v/c ratio for the
corridor is calculated based on the generated volume and capacity value, which is
estimated using the average green times of all signalized intersections along the
corridor. The Highway Capacity Manual Model procedure is used for the calculation of the v/c ratio. When considering a change in v/c ratio and fixing all other
factors, as summarized in Figure 1, the following remarks can be made:
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Figure 1. (a) Impact on Bus Travel Time

Figure 1. (b) Impact on Green Extension Success Rate
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TSP application would be most effective under moderate-to-heavy traffic
condition. TSP’s improvement on the B-Line bus performance decreases at
low bus approach v/c ratios, at which the buses would not encounter too
much traffic delay. The improvement also decreases as the traffic condition approaches capacity, because congestion would hinder bus movement.



The green extension success rate would be reduced as bus approach volume increases. The reduction in green extension success rate could be attributed to an increasing traffic volume on Granville Street, which lengthens the time required by the buses to enter the intersection after checking
in, making the buses less likely to clear the intersection during the green
extension phase.

Cross Street Volume/Capacity Ratio (Approach-Level)
This experiment examines the impact of TSP on cross street delay for various cross
street v/c ratios. The result shows that the impact of TSP on cross street performance is minimal at low cross street v/c ratios. Whereas, TSP has a moderate impact on cross street performance at cross streets with a v/c ratio above 0.8, it has a
significant impact on cross street performance (i.e., causes high cross street delay
and increases delay recovery cycles) at cross streets with v/c ratios above 0.9. Figure 2 shows the simulated cross street delay trends with and without TSP application under the approach v/c ratios of 0.8, 0.9, and 1.0. The v/c ratios are obtained
using the procedure described in the previous section. The numerical value on top
of each vertical line represents the duration of green extension (solid line) or red
truncation (dotted line) conferred to the B-Line bus approach, which is the difference between the actual green time and the maximum green time of the fixed
time signal phases. The circle identifies the maximum number of recovery cycles
required for each cross street v/c ratio scenario.
Bus Headway (Corridor-Level)
The B-Line bus travel time along the Granville Street corridor is also assessed under five headway scenarios, with and without the allowance of TSP calls in successive cycles. Figure 3 shows the improvement in bus travel time under different
headways when TSP is implemented.
Based on the results of this analysis, 10 minutes is the optimal bus headway at
which TSP brings the highest improvement (or reduction) in bus travel time. At
headways greater than the optimal headway (i.e., >10 minutes), fewer TSP requests
limit the benefits of TSP on the B-Line bus performance. Whereas, at headways
smaller than the optimal headway (i.e., <10 minutes), the improvement of TSP on
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Figure 2. Average Cross Street Cycle Delay (with and without TSP) at:
(a) v/c Ratio = 0.8

(b) v/c Ratio = 0.9

80

Impacts of Various Traffic Parameters on Transit Sginal Priority Effectiveness

(c) v/c Ratio = 1.0

Figure 3. Bus Headway Impact (with TSP)
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bus travel time is reduced, because a higher bus volume increases delay of the
buses.
Results also show that allowance of TSP calls in successive cycles would bring a
higher improvement in bus travel time at smaller headways, at which a higher number of TSP calls would be triggered in successive cycles. However, at B-Line bus
headway of 2 minutes, the improvement decreases, because a higher bus volume
would increase B-Line bus delay in the network.

Bus Stop Location (Approach-Level)
For this experiment, an “isolated-intersection model” is used because the B-Line
bus performance on an approach is studied. The model assumes a 4-minute bus
headway, allowance of TSP calls in successive cycles, and provision of TSP only to
the northbound B-Line buses. Two bus stop scenarios are considered in this experiment:


Farside Bus Stop Scenario: Stops are placed on the farside (or downstream)
of a signalized intersection.



Nearside Bus Stop Scenario: Stops are placed on the nearside (or upstream)
of a signalized intersection.

The above bus stop location scenarios are examined under various Granville Street
traffic volumes: 500, 1000, 1500, 2000, and 2500 Veh/hr/3-lanes, representing v/c
ratios from 0.2 to 0.95. Figure 4 shows the comparison. The B-Line bus delay value
expresses only the traffic delay of the buses, i.e., bus dwell time delay has been
excluded.
Figure 4 illustrates that a nearside bus stop would cause a higher delay to the BLine buses than a farside bus stop. This is because a significant portion of the green
extension would be wasted while passengers board and alight at a nearside bus
stop, thereby lowering the green extension success rate of the buses. This lengthens the bus waiting times at a signal and causes higher delays to the B-Line buses.
This result is in agreement with the findings of Daniel (1997) and Huffman, et al.
(1998) that a farside bus stop is more preferred when TSP is implemented. However, it should be noted that it is possible to address some of the nearside bus stop
conditions for the implementation of TSP, such as placing the detector immediately downstream of the stop or using delay timers if dwell time at a bus stop is
consistent.
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Figure 4. Bus Stop Location Impact on Average Bus Delay (with TSP)

Figure 5 shows the percentage increase in the average B-Line bus delay under different Granville Street (or bus approach) v/c ratios when a bus stop is moved from
the farside to the nearside of an intersection. In general, the bus delay would increase when a farside bus stop is converted to a nearside bus stop, and the deterioration in the bus delay would reduce as the bus approach v/c ratio increases. This is
likely due to a higher influence on bus delay by traffic congestion than by bus stop
location, when the bus approach v/c ratio increases.
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Figure 5. Nearside Bus Stop Impact on TSP Effectiveness

Bus Detector Location (Approach-Level)
An “isolated-intersection model” is deployed for this experiment because only the
B-Line bus approach delay is examined. For this experiment, seven B-Line bus checkin detector location scenarios are analyzed for a farside and a nearside bus stop,
when TSP is implemented. Figure 6 shows the comparison. The bus delay value
only expresses the traffic delay of the buses, i.e., dwell time delay has been excluded.
As discussed earlier, a farside bus stop would give a lower bus delay than a nearside
bus stop. Additionally, the result shows that the bus delay is less sensitive to the
check-in detector location when a nearside bus stop is placed. This is because the
performance of the B-Line buses would be more influenced by dwell time at nearside
bus stops than by the location at which the buses are detected. When a farside bus
stop is used, the improvement of TSP on bus delay would increase when check-in
detectors are placed further from the intersection stop bar. This is because placing
the detector further from the intersection would allow the red truncation or green
extension to start earlier. However, the check-in detector cannot be placed too far
from the intersection because of greater uncertainty in bus travel time from the
check-in detector to the intersection. It should also be noted that the optimal
detector location might vary with different signal conditions (e.g., cycle length,
maximum and minimum green times) and bus arrival pattern.
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Figure 6. Comparison of Detector Location Impact on Average Bus Delay
for Farside and Nearside Bus Stops (with TSP)

Table 1 compares the number of green extensions calls granted, the number of
green extension failures (i.e., the number of B-Line buses that cannot check-out
after the maximum green time elapsed), and the green extension success rates for
various bus stop location and bus detector location scenarios. Results show that a
higher number of green extensions are called when a nearside bus stop is used or
when the check-in detectors are placed further from an intersection. Under these
conditions, the B-Line buses require more time to enter the intersection after checking in; therefore, more B-Line buses would require a green extension to clear the
intersection. In addition, the green extension success rate would decrease as the
bus detector is placed further from the intersection, because this lengthens the
time required for the bus to enter an intersection after checking in.
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Table 1. Green Extension (GE) Effectiveness for Farside and Nearside
Bus Stops
Detector Location

Total # of GE

# of GE Failure

GE Success Rate

Farside

Farside

Farside

Nearside

Nearside

Nearside

50 / 75 m

2

6

0

2

100%

61%

100 m
150 m

3
3

6
6

0
0

2
2

100%
100%

61%
61%

200 m
250 m

4
6

7
9

0
2

3
6

100%
71%

52%
37%

300 m

6

9

2

6

71%

37%

Left Turn Volume/ Lane/ Phase (Approach-Level)
The “isolated-intersection model” is used for this experiment. Effects of the leftturn traffic (in direction parallel to the through-traveling buses) on TSP effectiveness of through-traveling buses at a signalized intersection are studied. The opposing-through v/c ratio is set to different values to generate different dissipation conditions for left-turn traffic. The influence of left-turn volume on TSP effectiveness
is compared under three left-turn conditions:
i. Shared through-left-turn (TH-LT) lane with permissive left-turn phase
ii. Exclusive left-turn (LT) lane with permissive left-turn phase
iii. Exclusive left-turn (LT) lane with protected-permissive left-turn phase.
In this analysis, the scenario of no left-turn traffic is used as the benchmark condition because this scenario is expected to give the highest effectiveness of TSP. The
TSP effectiveness of each left-turn scenario is measured by the change in bus approach delay relative to this benchmark left-turn volume (i.e., no left-turn).
The B-Line bus approach delay is examined under the three aforementioned leftturn conditions for left-turn (LT) volumes (in direction parallel to the throughtraveling buses) of 25, 50, 100, 150, and 200 Veh/hr and opposing-through (OppTH) volume of 1,000 Veh/hr, 1,500 Veh/hr and 2,000 Veh/hr, representing v/c ratios of 0.37, 0.55 and 0.74, respectively. It should be noted that high left-turn volume and high opposing-through volume scenarios might not be realistic for a permissive left-turn phasing scheme, but are performed to illustrate the theoretical
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trend of the change in B-Line bus delay and to compare results with other left-turn
conditions.
Table 2 shows a comparison of bus approach delay results for various left-turn
conditions, when TSP is implemented. The result shows that, without the use of a
Table 2. Left Turn Traffic Impact on Bus Average Approach Delay
(with TSP)
Opp-TH
Vol

1,000
v/c=0.37

1,500
v/c=0.55

2,000
v/c=0.74

LT
Vol

Change in Average B-Line Bus Approach Delay (Seconds)
Permissive LT Phase,
Shared LT-TH Lane

Permissive LT Phase,
Exclusive LT Lane

Protected LT Phase,
Exclusive LT Lane

0

0.0

0.0

0.0

25
50

0.5
0.9

-0.3
-0.4

-0.1
-0.2

100
150

3.0
7.2

0.0
0.6

-0.4
0.0

200
0

32.3
0.0

2.0
0.0

0.4
0.0

25
50

1.2
2.2

-0.1
-0.2

-0.4
0.1

100
150

25.2
63.2

2.3
22.2

-0.1
-0.1

200
0

83.9
0.0

49.8
0.0

-0.1
0.0

25
50

1.2
5.6

0.0
0.2

0.2
0.1

100
150

54.4
90.3

11.1
42.9

0.0
0.5

200

103.2

58.7

0.0

Note:
- All changes are compared to the “No Left-Turn” scenario for their corresponding opposingthrough volume and left turn condition.
- Bolded values represent scenarios that cause significant increase in B-Line bus approach
delay.
- Italic values represent results that might have caused by some fluctuation in the VISSIM
simulation from one scenario to another. The changes are assumed negligible when the
absolute change is less than 1.0 second.
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left-turn lane or a protected left-turn phase, a high left-turn volume would significantly increase the average delay of the buses when TSP is implemented. A high
left-turn volume and queue would increase the traffic usage on the center and
rightmost lanes, thereby increasing traffic hindrances to B-Line buses that run on
the rightmost lane. Additionally, the v/c ratio of opposing-through volume would
also significantly impact bus delay because the dissipation of left-turn traffic is controlled by the availability of an adequate gap of the opposing-through traffic. The
result also demonstrates a need for a protected left-turn phase and an exclusive
left-turn lane at an intersection with high left-turn and opposing-through volumes,
in order to maintain the effectiveness of a TSP application.

Signal Coordination (Corridor-Level)
This experiment tests the signal coordination impact on the effectiveness of TSP.
Default parameters and the NoTAC model are deployed to evaluate the Granville
Street corridor performance. Two coordination scenarios are compared:


Granville Street with Signal Coordination: To maintain coordination, the
green time of the cross street approaches is shortened accordingly when a
TSP call (i.e., green extension or red truncation) is granted. In addition, TSP
calls are not responded for two successive cycles to reduce the adverse
effect on cross street traffic.



Granville Street without Signal Coordination: No signal coordination is maintained along the Granville Street corridor (NTCIP 1211 standard violated).
The cycle length at an intersection could fluctuate with the length of a
green extension or red truncation; and the length of the cross street green
time could be maintained after a green extension is conferred. For this scenario, TSP calls do not respond for successive cycles, because the cross street
green time is not shortened after a TSP call.

The TSP effectiveness is expressed as the change in traffic delay in the “with coordination” scenario, the benchmark condition. The evaluations are performed at a
corridor-level and are disaggregated by the following categories: the entire corridor (i.e., major and cross streets traffic combined), major traffic approaches, cross
street approaches, and individual major traffic approach. Table 3 shows that removing signal coordination from Granville Street would increase the entire corridor delay, which is attributed to an increase in the major traffic delay on Granville
Street. Meanwhile, removing the coordination would result in minimal improvement in the cross street total delay, because green time for the cross street approaches is allowed to be maintained after a TSP call. These results suggest that, for
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the objective of maximizing TSP improvement in the total delay of the entire corridor, TSP would be more effective when applied with signal coordination. This
result agrees with Daniel’s (1997) proposal that providing priority for transit vehicles in a non-coordinated network would increase the overall delay of vehicles in
the network.

Table 3. Signal Coordination Impact on TSP Effectiveness
Total Delay (Seconds)

Delay with
coordination *

Delay with No
Coordination *

Delay
Change **

Delay
Change (%) **

Entire Corridor
Major traffic (vehicle)

8458
6216

8607
6341

+149
+125

+2%
+2%

Cross Street traffic
Northbound Only

2260

2250

-10

-0%

Northbound B-Line Buses
Northbound All Traffic

209
3820

223
4460

14
640

6%
17%

Southbound Only
Southbound B-Line Buses

299

299

-0

0%

Southbound All Traffic

2396

1899

-497

-21%

* The delay values are of scenarios with the implementation of TSP.
** The change or percentage change in delay is with respect to the “with coordination” scenario,
which is the actual scenario on the Granville Street corridor.

The result also shows that removing signal coordination from Granville Street would
worsen the delay of the northbound general traffic and the northbound B-Line
buses, which the default signal coordination heavily favors. On the other hand,
removing coordination along Granville Street is observed to bring about minimal
improvement to the southbound B-Line buses and significant improvement to
the southbound general traffic, which the original signal coordination does not
favor.
It should be noted that during the period studied (i.e., AM peak), northbound
volume was almost double the southbound volume. Therefore, it would not be
acceptable to deteriorate northbound traffic performance for the benefit of southbound traffic. As a result, coordination should be maintained with TSP application
for the benefit of the majority of traffic on Granville Street.
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Conclusion
Based on the results of the analyses in this research, the following general recommendations can be made:
1. TSP application would be most effective under moderate-to-heavy bus
approach traffic condition.
2. The allowance of TSP should be carefully considered at cross street with
high v/c ratio.
3. Left-turn volume (in the direction parallel to the through-traveling TSPeligible buses) and its associated queue could impact the effectiveness of
TSP. For the highest effectiveness of TSP, exclusive left-turn lane and protected left-turn phase for the left-turn traffic should be considered when
applying TSP at signalized intersection with heavy left-turn and opposingthrough volumes.
4. TSP is more sensitive to the location of check-in detectors when a farside
bus stop is placed than when a nearside bus stop is placed.
5. Placing the bus check-in detector further from the intersection to a certain
limit (i.e., within the clearance distance for the maximum green extension
interval) could improve B-Line bus performance and maintain the effectiveness of green extension.
6. For the best performance of the entire corridor, coordination should be
maintained when implementing TSP.
Based on the results of the analyses in this research, the following recommendations are specific to the TSP application of the 98 B-Line buses on Granville Street:
1. TSP application would be most effective at Granville Street v/c ratios between 0.6 and 0.9.
2. 10 minutes would be the optimal bus headway that brings about the highest effectiveness of TSP in improving the bus travel times.
3. TSP could have significant adverse impacts on cross street traffic at cross
street v/c ratios above 0.9.
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Abstr
act
Abstract
The rapid growth of India’s urban population has put enormous strains on all transport systems. Burgeoning travel demand far exceeds the limited supply of transport
infrastructure and services. Public transport, in particular, has been completely overwhelmed. Most bus and train services are overcrowded, undependable, slow, inconvenient, uncoordinated, and dangerous. Moreover, the public ownership and operation of most public transport services has greatly reduced productivity and inflated
costs. India’s cities desperately need improved and expanded public transport service. Unfortunately, meager government financial assistance and the complete lack
of any supportive policies, such as traffic priority for buses, place public transport in
an almost impossible situation.

Introduction
Public transport faces severe problems in almost all countries of the developing
world, although the situation varies from one country to another, and even from
one city to another (Vasconcellos 2001). Perhaps most important, the lack of financial resources prevents necessary investments in maintaining and upgrading
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existing bus and rail systems and building new ones. Likewise, many advanced technologies long available in Western Europe are simply not affordable in most developing countries. Public transport systems in the Third World are plagued by chronic
corruption and inefficiency, overcrowded and undependable service, congested
roadways that slow down buses, and an operating environment that is often chaotic and completely uncoordinated.
Those problems of public transport occur within the broader context of daunting
urban transport problems in general. Air pollution, noise, congestion, and traffic
fatality levels are often much more severe than those of developed countries. One
might expect the much lower incomes in developing countries to assure a huge
potential market of public transport riders. In fact, many city residents are so poor
that they cannot afford even low fares, and routes are not designed to serve the
poor at any rate. Thus, the poor in developing countries suffer even more than
those in the Western World from low levels of mobility and accessibility, especially
to jobs.
In many respects, the situation in India is typical of other developing countries.
The most important commonality is India’s low per-capita income—only US $2,540
in 2002, less than a tenth of the average incomes of countries in North America
and Western Europe (Central Intelligence Agency 2002). With 23 percent of its
urban population living in poverty, India has been forced to keep its public transport fares extremely low. That has sharply restricted the operating revenues of all
public transport systems, making it difficult to afford even routine maintenance
and vehicle replacement, let alone system modernization and expansion.
Poverty is not only a problem at the individual level, but also in the public sector,
with cities and transport systems desperately lacking the necessary financial resources for investment in infrastructure, vehicles, new technologies, and fare subsidies. The financial problems stemming from India’s low per-capita income are probably the most important challenges facing Indian public transport, but there are
many others as well: inefficiency, roadway congestion, traffic accidents, lack of planning, overcrowding, noise, and total lack of coordination of any kind.

Trends in Population and Land Use
The rapid growth of India’s urban population—as in other developing countries¾has
generated an enormous need for efficient public transport services to carry high
volumes of passengers through dense, congested urban areas. By 2001 over 285
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million Indians lived in cities, more than in all North American cities combined
(Office of the Registrar General of India 2001). There has been especially rapid
growth of the very largest metropolitan areas such as Mumbai (Bombay), Kolkata
(Calcutta), and Delhi, which now exceed 10 million residents each. Chennai (Madras), Hyderabad, Ahmedabad, and Bangalore each have more than 5 million residents. And 35 metropolitan areas have populations exceeding 1 million, almost
twice as many as in 1991. Since large cities are far more dependent on public transport than small cities, the need for public transport services has increased faster
than overall population growth.
Moreover, the lack of effective planning and land-use controls has resulted in rampant sprawled development extending rapidly in all directions, far beyond old city
boundaries into the distant countryside. That also has greatly increased the number and length of trips for most Indians, including those by public transport.
Most public policies in India actually encourage sprawl. In an explicit attempt to
decongest city centers, government regulations limit the ratio of floor areas to
land areas for buildings in the center, and thus restrict the heights of buildings and
density of development in the center. For example, the so-called “floor space index” in sampled city centers in India was only 1.6, compared to indices ranging
from 5 to 15 in other Asian city centers (Bertaud 2002; Padam and Singh 2001). By
contrast, government regulations permit higher floor space/land area ratios in suburban developments, yet more inducement for firms to decentralize. Indeed, local
governments even advertise the less stringent regulations in the suburbs to promote more development there. Such land-use policies obviously discourage development in the center and force both firms and residences to seek locations on the
suburban fringe. Moreover, local governments have permitted scattered commercial and residential development in outlying areas without the necessary infrastructure such as roads, utilities, hospitals, shopping, and schools. That generates long
trips between residences and almost all other trip destinations.
Just as in North America, most new commercial development is in the distant
suburbs. For example, Tidal Park is a software center on the outskirts of Chennai;
Gurgaon is a large new industrial area outside Delhi; and Pimpri-Chinchwad is a
similar center outside of Pune (Bertaud 2002). Similarly, Bangalore is planning several technology parks on its fringe as well as several circumferential highways in
the suburbs, both of which will induce further decentralization. In most cases, there
is inadequate infrastructure to serve these new suburban developments and the
residences locating around them. Ramachandran (1989) characterizes Indian sub97
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urbs as an “uncontrolled mix of industrial development, dumps and obnoxious
uses,” with the “extension of urban settlement causing conditions in the overtaken
villages to deteriorate, both physically and socially.” The leap-frog development
typical of suburban sprawl tends to follow major highways out of Indian cities to
the distance countryside.
There are important consequences of such low-density, sprawled decentralization
for public transport. Just as in North America and Europe, it generates trips that
are less focused in well-traveled corridors and thus more difficult for public transport to serve. In India, it has led to rapid growth in car and motorcycle ownership
and use and thus increasingly congested roadways that slow down buses, increase
bus operating costs, and further discourage public transport use.

Trends in Public Transport
The best statistics for public transport in India are for suburban rail, because it is
centrally owned and operated by Indian Railways. As shown in Figure 1, suburban
rail usage has sharply increased over the past five decades, with a 14-fold growth in
passenger km of travel (Indian Railways 2001). There are no comprehensive national statistics on bus service supply, let alone the number of riders, but the fragmented statistics for individual cities suggest substantial growth. For example, in
the 10 years from 1990 to 2000, there was an 86 percent increase in the size of
Mumbai’s bus fleet, and a 54 percent increase in Chennai’s bus fleet. While the size
of Delhi’s public bus fleet actually fell, the number of private buses rose by almost
twice as much, yielding a net 28 percent increase (Association of State Road Transport Undertakings 2002).

98

The Crisis of Public Transport in India

Figure 1. Growth in Suburban Rail Travel in Indian Cities
1951 to 2001 (in millions of passenger km)

Source: Indian Railways 2002

Buses carry more than 90 percent of public transport in Indian cities. Indeed, most
Indian cities have no rail transport at all and rely instead on a combination of buses,
minivans, auto rickshaws, cycle rickshaws, and taxis. Even in most of the largest
cities, rail transport carries less than a third of public transport passengers. The
only exception is Mumbai, which has India’s most extensive suburban rail network,
carrying more than 5 million passengers a day¾58 percent of total public transport passengers in the region (v. 42% by bus) and 80 percent of total passenger km
(v. 20% by bus) (Brihanmumbai Electric Supply and Transport 2003; Indian Railways 2002).
In general, the larger the city size, the higher the percentage of urban trips served
by public transport in India: 30 percent in cities with population between 1 and 2
million, 42 percent for cities with populations between 2 and 5 million, and 63
percent for cities with populations over 5 million (Sreedharan 2003). Thus, the
especially rapid growth of large cities suggests a further rise in future demands for
public transport in India.
As shown by Figure 2, however, there is substantial variation among cities of the
same size category. Almost 80 percent of all trips in Kolkata are by some form of
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public transport, compared to about 60 percent in Mumbai, and 42 percent in
both Chennai and Delhi. Differences in land use and roadway supply explain some
of the variation. Delhi and Chennai are lower density, more polycentric, and more
spread out than Mumbai and Kolkata. Delhi also has a particularly extensive roadway network, while the supply of roadways in other large Indian cities is much
more limited. For example, 21 percent of Delhi’s total land area is devoted to roads,
compared to only 11 percent in Mumbai and 5 percent in Kolkata. Mumbai and
Kolkata also have more restricted geographies, since both are situated on peninsulas that channel travel and land-use development in only a few directions. Such
focused travel corridors especially encourage suburban rail use, as in Mumbai. Delhi
has no such geographic restrictions and sprawls out in all directions. Thus, Delhi
currently relies primarily on auto rickshaws, motorcycles, taxis, and private cars to
serve the multidestinational, less focused travel patterns of its residents.

Figure 2. Percent Distribution of Urban Trips by Means of Travel
for Selected Indian Cities, 2002

Sources: Pendakur 2002 and World Bank 2002
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The range of public transport services available also varies considerably, even among
the largest categories of cities. Only Mumbai, Kolkata, and Chennai have extensive
suburban rail services. Delhi has limited suburban rail services. Until recently, Kolkata
had India’s only underground metro system (16.5 route km), but Delhi is currently
constructing a far more extensive metro (62.5 route km) (Delhi Metro Rail Corporation 2003a). Chennai has a hybrid surface and elevated metro, designated as Mass
Rapid Transport System, which currently extends 8.6 km and is being expanded by
another 11.2 km (Southern Railway 2003). Finally, Kolkata has India’s only remaining tram system, a 68-km double-track network of old, seriously deteriorating tracks
and vehicles.
As noted previously, buses account for most public transport services, even in these
large cities, and for virtually all public transport services in cities with less than 5
million residents. Moreover, all Indian cities feature large numbers of auto rickshaws (3-wheeled motorized, minicars), taxis, and cycle rickshaws (human-powered carts).

Problems and Challenges
The sharply rising demands for public transport have overwhelmed the existing
public transport systems in India. Trains and buses in most cities are dangerously
overcrowded. On suburban rail lines in Mumbai, peak-hour trains must carry more
than twice their maximum design capacity, leading to inhuman traveling conditions, with so-called “super dense crush loads” of 14 to 16 standing passengers per
square meter of floor space (Varshneya, Jain, and Sahai 2002; Ministry of Railways
2002)! On peak-hour trains, many passengers are forced to hang out doors and
windows or to ride between train cars or even hang on the outsides of cars. Suburban trains and stations seem hopelessly overcrowded and desperately need expanded capacity.
Buses in Indian cities are doubly disadvantaged by congested conditions. Buses
themselves are seriously overcrowded, with some passengers forced to ride on the
outsides of vehicles. In addition, however, buses must negotiate extremely congested, narrow streets, with no separate rights-of-way at all, having to fight with a
mixed array of animal-drawn carts, minivans, cars, taxis, motorized two-wheelers,
auto rickshaws, pedestrians, cyclists, and street vendors. Severe roadway congestion has slowed down most buses to a crawl during much of the day¾as slow as 6
to 10 km per hour in many large cities (Gakenheimer and Zegras 2003).
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These congested conditions in public transport vehicles, stations, and rights-ofway not only slow down travel but make it outright dangerous. Tens of thousands
of public transport passengers are killed or injured every year in accidents. Many
buses and trams do not even have doors and windows that can be closed, and that
only encourages passengers to ride by protruding from inside the vehicle or by
hanging on from outside. Clearly, riding on the roofs or sides of buses and trains is
inherently unsafe and results directly from the severe undercapacity of public transport systems in India. Slow, uncomfortable, undependable, and unsafe conditions
in the early 1990s led to riots of passengers protesting these inhumane conditions,
forcing some of the service expansion efforts described later in this article (Acharya
2000).
One consequence of insufficient service quantity and terrible service quality is that
public transport has been losing market share in many cities. Dissatisfied public
transport passengers are increasingly turning to the private car, and even more
dramatically, to the relatively low-cost motorized two-wheelers, which have experienced a boom in ownership and use in the past 10 years. As shown in Figure 3,
the total number of private cars and motorized two-wheelers increased roughly
four times faster than the number of buses over recent decades (World Bank 2002;
Ministry of Road Transport and Highways 2003). For much of the Indian middle
class, the motorcycle offers an affordable, far more flexible, convenient, faster, and
more dependable way of getting around than public transport. For affluent Indians, the private car offers an even higher level of comfort and greater prestige,
although it is more likely than two-wheelers to be slowed down by roadway congestion.
The deteriorating quality of public transport service reinforces the impact of the
rapid decentralization of Indian cities. Both trends encourage a shift away from
space-saving public transport toward individual motorized transport. That has
greatly increased roadway congestion, further reduced travel speeds, and aggravated traffic safety problems. Perhaps because of its separate rights-of-way and
thus higher speeds, suburban rail continues to experience strong growth in passenger levels, in spite of crowded vehicles and stations and undependable service.
By comparison, bus systems in some cities have suffered losses of passengers in
recent years, as their overcrowded buses get bogged down in slower and slower
traffic.
Another crucial problem of Indian transport is inefficiency, lack of productivity,
overstaffing, excessively high operating costs, and large subsidy needs. Especially
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Figure 3. Growth of India’s Motor Vehicle Fleet by Type of Vehicle
1950-2001 (in thousands of vehicles)

Source: Ministry of Road Transport and Highways 2003

since the mid-1990s, operating deficits have been rising rapidly. For bus systems in
the largest cities, the combined operating deficit quadrupled (Association of State
Road Transport 2002b), and for Indian Railways, the annual operating deficit tripled.
As shown in Figure 4, most publicly owned bus systems in large cities generally
cover about 70 to 90 percent of operating costs, much higher than large public
transport systems in Western Europe. The most unprofitable bus system is in
Kolkata, which covers only 42 percent of costs through passenger fares, while Delhi
(72%) and Mumbai (80%) cover about three-fourths of costs. At the high end of
the scale, Bangalore (105%) is actually profitable, and Hyderabad (92%) almost
breaks even. It is notable that both of the publicly owned bus firms in Bangalore
and Hyderabad contract many of their services to privately operated companies,
which probably explains the better economic performance.
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Figure 4. Proportion of Operating Expenses Covered by Passenger
Revenues for Selected Cities in India, 2000–2001

Source: Association of State Road Transport Undertakings 2002

Clearly, much could be done to improve the efficiency of both bus and rail operations, most of which are publicly owned, operated, and regulated. There are many
institutional obstacles to any fundamental changes, including powerful labor unions
representing employees, which have blocked changes that would disadvantage
them.

Privatization
One possible solution to many of these problems might be the selective privatization
of India’s public transport sector. That could be done either through opening up
the market to private firms (who would own, manage, operate and finance their
own systems) or by having public agencies contract with private firms to operate
services on a systemwide basis, for selective routes, or for selected functions (like
maintenance). Rail systems have only rarely been privatized anywhere in the world
(except for certain narrow functions), while there is considerable experience with
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bus privatization. Thus, privatization seems an option only for bus services, but
they account for more than 90 percent of India’s public transport.
Privatization of public transport in India was strongly encouraged by the World
Bank (2002), which accused publicly owned and operated systems of being inefficient and highly unprofitable, providing insufficient and low-quality services, and
failing to respond to market demands. Although there were some minor attempts
at privatization in the 1980s, the first large-scale privatization of buses occurred in
Delhi in 1992, when numerous small, private bus firms entered the market. Unfortunately, the new private operators were not adequately regulated and coordinated, leading to complete chaos. The new private services tortured passengers
with lengthy, zig-zag routes, long waiting times, completely unreliable service, extreme overcrowding, unqualified drivers, speeding and reckless driving, fights among
competing buses, and even running down passengers waiting at bus stops. Moreover, the private buses were often poorly maintained, unsafe, noisy, and highly polluting, adding to the already severe congestion, safety, and air pollution problems
in Delhi.
In the years since 1992, regulations have been strengthened and better enforced.
Moreover, the many private bus operators are now much better coordinated than
at the outset. Service quality problems still remain, but privatization appears to
have brought some substantial economic benefits. In a comparison of public and
private bus operators in Delhi, the World Bank found that private bus firms carried
twice as many passengers per bus per day (1,584 v. 751), earned twice as much
revenue per bus per day (2,700 v. 1,321 Rupees), required less than half the staffing
per bus (4.6 v. 9.6 employees), cost less than half as much per bus km (7.7 v. 17.2
Rupees), and actually made a profit (3.2 Rupees per bus km) while the public bus
firms ran a loss (11.0 Rupees loss per bus km) (Marwah, Sibal, and Sawant 2001).
These financial comparisons between public and private buses are somewhat exaggerated, since private firms can usually select profitable routes, while public firms
are often required to provide unprofitable services on lightly used routes to achieve
social objectives and ensure comprehensive coverage to the entire city. Moreover,
private bus companies offer their employees much lower wages, less job security,
and less generous fringe benefits such as pensions and health insurance. Thus, to
some extent, the private bus firms have lower costs due to lower salaries for their
workers.
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Kolkata currently has a large number of privately operated buses as well (about
1,800 private v. 1,200 public), and as in Delhi, they have fewer employees per bus,
lower costs, and much higher cost coverage through fare revenues than the publicly operated buses. Privatization in Bangalore and Hyderabad has so far been limited to the contracting out of certain routes to private operators, but still with the
overall coordination of a public agency.
It appears that privatization does indeed have much potential to improve efficiency, but that it must be accompanied by strict regulations, performance standards, and overall coordination to ensure an integrated network of services. In light
of the transport funding crisis in Indian cities, they may have little choice but to
seek the cost savings possible with privatization and increased competition.

Funding
Since passenger revenues do not cover the full costs of operation and capital investment of public transport, government financial assistance is obviously crucial.
As owner of Indian Railways, the Central Government must bear whatever operating deficit remains after the substantial cross-subsidies from profitable freight services. In the past, the Central Government also bore most of the costs of capital
investment, but in recent years, state governments have financed growing portions of these costs, especially for the expansions and improvements of suburban
rail systems in Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata, and Hyderabad (Ministry of Railways
2002). To encourage more state contributions, Indian Railways now gives priority
to projects with up to two-thirds state government funding.
Funding for new and expanded metro rail systems comes from the Central Government as well as state and local governments, but there is no exact formula, and
the distribution of contributions varies from case to case. The World Bank, the
Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), and other international lending agencies have also provided loans for large infrastructure projects. For example,
a JBIC loan is funding two-thirds of the capital cost of building the Delhi Metro
(Delhi Metro Rail 2003b). Rail system operating deficits, however, are primarily
borne by local governments.
Most bus services are still publicly owned and operated by STUs (State Transport
Undertakings), whose operating and capital investment costs are covered by a combination of state and local government subsidies, grants, and loans that vary from
state to state.
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Significantly, no government level has any dedicated taxes whose proceeds would
be automatically earmarked for public transport. Thus, financial support for public transport is tenuous, depending on annual budgetary appropriations. With critical shortages of revenues at every government level, public transport must compete each year with many other urgent needs for public funds. The willingness of
the Central and state governments to fund public transport can vary substantially
over time, making long-term planning very difficult.

Recent and Planned Improvements
In spite of severe shortages of both public and private financing for improving public
transport, several Indian cities have been trying to provide more and better services to meet burgeoning travel demands. The most extensive improvements are
in Mumbai. For example, Indian Railways has already opened two new suburban
rail lines and has plans for additional extensions. Several existing lines have been
vastly improved by constructing additional tracks (from one to two tracks and
from two to four tracks) to permit separation of local and express trains. Moreover, cars have been added to trains, average speeds have increased, and frequency
of service has also risen—measures aimed at mitigating the overcrowding problem. By relocating more than 6,000 illegal slum dwellings that encroached on land
directly adjacent to railway tracks, Indian Railways increased service dependability,
speed, and safety (Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority 2003).
An especially innovative initiative is the planned Sky Bus system, which will feature
several lines of express buses on elevated guideways. The initial phase, which extends 8.3 km, scheduled for completion by 2006, should help to relieve the most
congested suburban rail and bus routes in the same corridors (Konkan Railway
Corporation Ltd. 1999). Finally, the main bus operator in Mumbai (BEST) has already introduced smart cards for fare collection on some premium bus services
and also plans to introduce low-floor buses to facilitate travel by passengers with
disabilities (Brihanmumbai Electric Supply and Transport 2003).
Delhi has been innovative on at least three different fronts. It has been constructing a new metro system with three lines, but only a small section is currently in
service. When completed, it will have 12.5 km of underground lines and 50 km of
surface or elevated lines. By the year 2005, the Delhi Metro is expected to carry
more than two million passengers a day (Delhi Metro Rail Corporation 2003c).
Delhi has also been at the forefront of innovations in bus services, both by requir107
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ing a complete switchover to nonpolluting CNG buses and by introducing
privatization and increased competition among bus firms to reduce costs. As noted
earlier, both of those policy changes caused enormous disruptions in service for
several transitional years, but the overall result has been positive.
Kolkata is currently extending its existing 16.5 km underground metro by another
8.5 km (Metro Railway Kolkata 2003)
Chennai completed the first phase of its Mass Rapid Transit System in 1997, which
includes 6 km of elevated track and 2.6 km of surface track. Currently, the system is
being extended by another 11.1 km, with at least 40km of future expansions planned
(Southern Railway 2003). The initial phase was disappointing because it was not
well coordinated with bus and suburban rail services, but those problems are currently being handled through significant improvements in parking and better connections to bus and suburban rail. Connections are also being improved between
three of the suburban rail lines in Chennai, with physical links now possible thanks
to gauge conversions for compatibility. Finally, Chennai has plans to introduce privatized, competitive bus services on roughly half its bus routes, following the example of Delhi and the recommendations of the World Bank.
Bangalore had planned a new light rail system, but it has been indefinitely postponed due to a shortage of funds. Instead, a less expensive system of grade-separated busways and high-capacity articulate buses is being considered (Gaur 2002).
The suburban rail services in Hyderabad are being expanded and improved, with a
special focus on upgrading station areas and enhancing safety. In addition, transfers between bus and rail services are being facilitated by better coordination between the city bus services and Indian Railways.

Recommended Policy Shifts
Given the rapid growth of India’s largest cities and the desperate need for better
and expanded public transport, it is crucial that policies change to improve the
entire range of public transport services offered. Unfortunately, the Indian government has been emphasizing instead the need to further develop the nascent automobile industry in India and has actually encouraged more private car ownership
and use. Indian cities are simply not equipped to handle increased volumes of private vehicle use. Roadways are already hopelessly congested, with average speeds
declining each year. Even for automobile users, it will be important to improve
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public transport, if only to remove some traffic from the streets and thus reduce
congestion to manageable levels and increase travel speeds.
Clearly, public transport must be given priority attention to avoid further deterioration of air quality, traffic safety, congestion, and noise in Indian cities. While some
improvements can be made even with existing funding levels, most would require
massive infusions of new funding for expanded and modernized bus and rail systems. Equally important, state and local governments must give traffic priority to
buses, both through special bus lanes and signal priority over private transport.
With more than 90 percent of public transport passengers in Indian cities relying
on buses, it is especially important to upgrade bus services through modern, safe
vehicles and priority on the congested roadways. The heavy, high-floor buses currently in service in most cities are noisy, polluting, fuel-inefficient, and unsafe. They
are built on truck chassis with such high floors that boarding is slow and difficult.
Moreover, they have slow acceleration as well as poor fuel economy due to their
weight, and are inappropriate to urban use. Many buses do not even have closable
windows and doors to protect passengers from the weather and from falling out of
the vehicle. It is essential to replace these outdated buses with modern, safe, clean,
and fuel-efficient vehicles.
Improving and expanding rail systems is also crucial, since they are insulated from
the congestion delays caused by roadway traffic. Unfortunately, they are usually
very expensive, and it is not realistic to expect that even most large Indian cities
will be able to afford new rail systems. Moreover, for medium and small cities, where
public transport services are either nonexistent or very infrequent, as well as slow
and crowded, improved bus service is the only feasible option. Private vehicles have
a much higher share of total trips in small and medium-sized cities precisely because the bus services there are so inadequate.
Within the current funding limits, it would still be possible to vastly improve the
transfer connections between rail and bus lines, as well as to introduce integrated
ticketing for all public transport modes. In addition, the privatization and increased
competition among bus services already implemented in Delhi and a few other
cities might be adopted more widely, as it would increase efficiency and reduce
costs. That would, however, have to be accompanied by strict regulation and enforcement of safety and pollution standards combined with overall regionwide
coordination of all public transport services. It was the failure to regulate and coor-
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dinate the new private bus operators in Delhi that led to the serious problems of
unsafe, overcrowded, unpredictable, and uncoordinated private buses.
The main problem in Indian cities, however, is financial. To some extent, operating
revenues of public transport firms could be greatly enhanced by targeting fare subsidies to low-income passengers and raising considerably the fares for the middle
and upper classes. As noted earlier, fares on most systems are extremely low¾and
passenger volumes are extremely high¾so that even modest increases might yield
substantial revenues for system maintenance, modernization, and expansion. Fares
cannot be raised too high, however, even among middle-class riders, since they
might then be diverted to private transport modes, which cause the most urban
transport problems. Thus, larger subsidies from the public sector will be essential.
Until all levels of government in India devote the necessary funding to expanding
and improving public transport, it will remain overcrowded, unsafe, undependable, and unpleasant, thus encouraging ever more Indians to turn instead to the
private car and motorcycles, which would lead to even more serious congestion
and pollution problems in Indian cities. The ideal source of such funding would be
some sort of dedicated gasoline or private motor vehicle tax whose revenues would
be devoted specifically to the improvement of urban transport conditions, including better roadways, better bicycling and walking facilities, and above all, better
bus and rail services. Many of the world’s developed countries have used such dedicated gasoline and motor vehicle taxes for decades to fund their public transport
improvements. In India, it would be doubly beneficial. Such a tax would discourage nonessential private car ownership and use. Moreover, the burden of the tax
would fall on relatively affluent Indians, so that the overall impact would be quite
progressive. The solution to public transport’s financing problem in India seems
quite clear, but does the Indian government have the political will to implement it?
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